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ASSESSMENT OF INFORMATION SECURITY MATURITY LEVELS AND 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 COMPLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY 
SUMMARY 
With society’s increasing dependency on information technology (IT), the 
consequences of security breaches can be extremely grave. In addition to monetary 
losses, breaches of information systems can also cause damages to businesses such as 
disruption of internal processes and communications, the loss of potential sales, loss 
of competitive advantage, and negative impacts on a company’s reputation, goodwill 
and trust. As a result, information security management (ISM) has become a required 
function. In many cases, it is impossible or nearly impossible to run a business 
without the smooth and secure operation of its information systems. 
The information security within organizations is ensured by establishing and 
maintaining effective information security management systems, integrating a well 
balanced set of different safeguards selected on the risk basis. To protect 
organizational information assets from both internal and external attacks, many 
different information security standards and guidelines have been proposed and 
developed. The most representative example of such systems is the Information 
Security Management System (ISMS), defined in the International Organization for 
Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission ISO/IEC 27001 standard, 
as the part of the overall management system, based on a business risk approach, to 
establish, implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain and improve information 
security within the organization. 
The purpose of this thesis is to carry out a review of the organizations’ information 
security maturity levels and evaluating ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard compliance. 
To this end, we conducted a survey among 80 organizations from 8 business 
industries in Turkey. The 72 information security related questions, derived from 133 
security measures in ISO/IEC 17799:2005, cover information security measures that 
should be implemented by organizations, including organizational, physical and 
technical controls.  
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TÜRKĐYE’DEKĐ ORGANĐZASYONLARIN BĐLGĐ GÜVENLĐĞĐ 
OLGUNLUK SEVĐYELERĐNĐN BELĐRLENMESĐ VE ISO/IEC 27001:2005 
STANDARDINA UYUMLULUKLARININ DEĞERLENDĐRĐLMESĐ 
ÖZET 
Toplumdaki her kesimin bilgi teknolojisine (BT) artan bağımlılığı, güvenlik 
ihlallerinin sonuçlarını son derece önemli hale getirmektedir. Bilgi sistemlerinin 
savunmasızlığı maddi kayıpların yanında, iç süreçlerin ve iletişimin kesintiye 
uğramasına, satışların düşmesine, rekabet avantajının kaybolmasına ve şirketin imajı 
ile güvenilirliği üzerinde olumsuz etkilere yol açmaktadır. Tüm bu nedenlerden 
dolayı, günümüzde bilgi güvenliği yönetimi (BGY) olmazsa olmaz bir unsur haline 
gelmiştir. Bugün pek çok durumda bilgi sistemleri güvenlik önlemleri olmadan bir işi 
yürütebilmek son derece riskli bir hale gelmiştir.  
Kurumdaki bilgi güvenliği, risk esasına göre belirlenen önlemler seti ile bütünleşen 
etkili bir bilgi güvenliği yönetim sistemi kurulması ve sürdürülmesi ile 
sağlanmaktadır. Kurumsal bilgi varlıklarını iç ve dış saldırılara karşı korumak için, 
çok farklı bilgi güvenliği standartları ve kuralları yayınlanmış ve geliştirilmiştir. Bu 
standartların en bilinen örneği, bilgi güvenliğini kurmak, uygulamak, yürütmek, 
izlemek, gözden geçirmek, sürdürmek ve geliştirmek amacıyla genel yönetim 
sisteminin parçası olarak görülen ISO/IEC 27001 standardıdır.  
Bu tezin amacı, kurumların bilgi güvenliği olgunluk düzeylerini belirlemek ve 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standardı ile uyumluluklarını değerlendirmektir. Bu amaçla, 
Türkiye’deki 8 farklı sektörden 80 farklı firmadaki bilgi güvenliği yöneticilerine ve 
sorumlularına, ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standardındaki 133 güvenlik önlemleri ve 
kontrolleri esas alınarak hazırlanan, 72 soruluk bir anket gönderilmiştir. Gelen 
yanıtların değerlendirilmesi sonuç bölümünde sunulmuştur. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s global markets, business operations are enabled by technology. From 
boardroom to mailroom, businesses make deals, ship goods, track client accounts, 
and inventory company assets, all through the implementation of systems made 
possible by information technology (IT). IT enables the storage and transportation of 
information-often a company‘s most valuable resource-from one business unit to 
another. But what happens if the vehicle breaks down, even for a little while? 
Business deals fall through, shipments are lost, and company assets become even 
more vulnerable to threats from both inside and outside the firm. In the past, the 
business manager’s response to this possibility was to proclaim, “We have 
technology people to handle technology problems. This remark might have been 
valid in the days when technology was confined to the climate-controlled rooms of 
the data center and information processing was centralized. In the last 20 years, 
however, technology has permeated every facet of the business environment. 
Businesses now move when employees move from office to office or from city to 
city or even office to home. Since businesses have become more fluid, the concept of 
computer security has evolved into the idea of information security (Whitman and 
Mattord, 2007).  
1.1 Security and Information Security 
In general, security is defined as “the quality or state of being secure to be free from 
danger”. To be secure is to be protected from adversaries or other hazards. National 
security, for example, is a system of multilayered processes that protects the 
sovereignty of a state, its assets, resources, and people. Achieving an appropriate 
level of security for an organization also depends on the implementation of a 
multilayered system. Security is often achieved by means of several strategies 
usually undertaken simultaneously or used in combination with another. While each 
strategy has its own focus and builds on its own specializations, the various strategies 
 share many common elements. From a management perspective, each must be 
properly planned, organized, staffed, directed, and controlled
In today’s competitive business environment, information is the lifeline of many 
organizations. It should therefore 
for any reason, information is compromised, the organization can lose time, 
and money and/or business opportunities.
Information security (InfoSec) is the protection of information from a wide rang
threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimize business risk, and maximize 
return on investments and business opportunities. 
broad areas of information security management, computer and data security, and 
network security as demonstrated in Figure 
Figure 1.1 :
1.1.1 Key Concepts of Information Security
The traditional view of information security includes the three cornerstones of 
information security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability, also known as the 
C.I.A. of information security.
model (Committee on National Security Systems) of information security, has been 
the industry standard for computer security since the development of the mainframe.
2 
 (Anderson, 2006)
be protected, secured and managed accordingly. If, 
  
Information security includes the 
1.1 (Whitman and Mattord, 2007)
 
  Components of information security 
 
 The C.I.A. triangle, which is the basis of the CNSS 
.  
labor, 
e of 
.  
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The C.I.A. triangle is founded on three desirable characteristics of information-
confidentiality, integrity, and availability-that are as important today as they were 
when first put forth. However, present-day needs have made these three concepts 
alone inadequate because they are limited in scope and cannot encompass the 
constantly changing environment of the IT industry. Threats to these three 
characteristics of information have evolved into a vast collection of potential 
dangers, including accidental or intentional damage, destruction, theft, unintended or 
unauthorized modification, or other misuses from human or other threats. This new 
environment of constantly evolving threats has necessitated the development of a 
more robust model of the characteristics of information. The updated model 
addresses the complexities of the current information security environment and the 
rapidly changing modern IT industry. The C.I.A. triangle, therefore, has expanded 
into a more comprehensive list of critical characteristics of information (Baker and 
Wallace, 2007). 
Confidentiality: 
Confidentiality of information ensures that only those with sufficient privileges and a 
demonstrated need may access certain information. When unauthorized individuals 
or systems can view information, confidentiality is breached. To protect the 
confidentiality of information, a number of measures are used, including: 
- Information classification 
- Secure document storage 
- Application of general security policies 
- Education of information custodians and end users 
- Cryptography (encryption) 
Confidentially is closely related to another key characteristic of information, privacy. 
In an organization, confidentiality of information is especially important for personal 
information about employees, customers, or patients. People expect that an 
organization will closely guard such information. Whether the organization is a 
federal agency, a commercial enterprise, or a nonprofit charity, problems arise when 
organizations disclose confidential information. Disclosure can occur either 
deliberately or by mistake. For example, confidential information could be 
mistakenly e-mailed to someone outside the organization rather than inside the 
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organization. Alternatively, perhaps an employee discards a document containing 
critical information without destroying it. Alternatively, maybe a hacker successfully 
breaks into an internal database of a Web-based organization and steals sensitive 
information about clients, such as names, addresses, or credit card information 
(Beautement and Sasse, 2009). 
Integrity: 
Integrity is the quality or state of being whole, complete and uncorrupted. The 
integrity of information is threatened when it is exposed to corruption, damage, 
destruction, or other disruption of its authentic state. Corruption can occur while 
information is being entered, stored, or transmitted. 
Many computer viruses and worms, for example, are designed to corrupt data. For 
this reason, the key method for detecting an integrity failure of a file system from an 
attack by a virus or worm is to look for changes in one file’s state as indicated by the 
file’s size, or in a more advanced operating system, the file’s hash value or 
checksum. 
The corruption of a file, however, does not always result from deliberate attacks. 
Faulty programming or even noise in the transmission channel or media can cause 
data to lose its integrity. For example, a low voltage state in a signal carrying a 
digital bit (a one or zero) can cause the receiving system to record the data 
incorrectly. 
To compensate for internal and external threats to the integrity of information, 
systems employ a variety of error control techniques, including redundancy bits and 
check bits. During each transmission, algorithms, hash values, and error-correcting 
codes ensure the integrity of the information. Data that has not been verified in this 
manner is retransmitted or otherwise recovered (Beautement and Sasse, 2009). 
Availability: 
Availability is the characteristic of information that enables user access to 
information without interference or obstruction and in a useable format. A user in 
this definition may be either a person or another computer system. Availability does 
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not imply that the information is accessible to any user; rather, it means availability 
to authorized users (Beautement and Sasse, 2009).  
Privacy: 
The information that is collected, used, and stored by an organization is intended 
only for the purposes stated to the data owner and at the time it was collected. This 
definition of privacy does not focus on freedom from observation (the meaning 
usually associated with the word), but rather means that information will be used 
only in ways known to person providing it. Many organizations collect, swap, and 
spell personal information as commodity. It is now possible to collect and combine 
information on individuals form separate sources, which has yielded detailed 
databases whose data might be used in ways not agreed to, or even communicated to, 
the original data owner. Many people have become aware of these practices and are 
looking to government for protection of their privacy (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
Identification: 
An information system possesses the characteristic of identification when it is able to 
recognize individual users. Identification is the first step in gaining access to secured 
material, and it serves as the foundation are essential to establishing the level of 
access or authorization that an individual is granted. Identification is typically 
performed by means of a user name or other ID (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
Authentication: 
Authentication occurs when a control provides proof that a used possesses the 
identity that he or she claims. Examples include the use of cryptographic certificates 
to establish Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connections, or the use of cryptographic 
hardware devices – for example, hardware tokens provided by companies such as 
SecureID and AuthenX – to confirm a user’s identity (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
Authorization: 
After the identity of a user is authenticated, a process called authorization provides 
assurance that the user (whether a user or a computer) has been specifically and 
explicitly authorized by the proper authority to access, update, or delete the contents 
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of access control lists and authorization groups in a networking environment. 
Another example is a database authorization scheme to verify that the user of an 
application is authorized for specific functions such as read, write, create, and delete 
(Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
Accountability: 
The characteristic of accountability exists when a control provides assurance that 
every activity undertaken can be attributed to a named person or automated process. 
For example, audit logs that track user activity on an information system provide 
accountability (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
1.2 Management 
A successful information security program combines the conceptual elements to 
reduce risk to its information assets. The art of accomplishing meaningful reductions 
in risk requires communication and cooperation among all three communities of 
interest. In other words, securing information technology can be achieved only 
through careful management and dynamic leadership. 
In its simplest form, management is the process of achieving objectives using a given 
set of resources. For the purpose of managing information security and the key 
characteristics of information, an organization implements the Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) and uses the ISO standards as a guide to develop the 
effective ISMS (Surcel and Amancei, 2007).  
1.2.1 Information Security Management 
With society’s increasing dependency on information technology (IT), the 
consequences of security breaches can be extremely grave. In addition to monetary 
losses, breaches of information systems can also cause damages to businesses such as 
disruption of internal processes and communications, the loss of potential sales, loss 
of competitive advantage, and negative impacts on a company’s reputation, goodwill 
and trust. As a result, information security management (ISM) has become a required 
function. In many cases, it is impossible or nearly impossible to run a business 
without the smooth and secure operation of its information systems.  
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To protect organizational information assets from both internal and external attacks, 
many different information security standards and guidelines have been proposed 
and developed. For example, the Generally Accepted System Security Principles 
(GASSP) is a joint international effort between ten countries to develop a set of rules, 
practices, and procedures to achieve information integrity, availability, and 
confidentiality. The Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publications 
provide guidelines that are mandatory for government agencies, but optional for the 
private sector. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 17799 is 
described as a suitable model for ISM and an appropriate vehicle for addressing ISM 
issues in organizations. Additionally, ISM literature has provided different checklists 
and hundreds of “best practices” for practitioners to use (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 
2009).  
1.3 Principles of Information Security Management 
Information security funding and planning decisions involve more than just technical 
managers, such as information security managers or members of the information 
security team. Rather, the process involves three distinct groups of decision makers, 
or communities of interest:  
- Information security managers and professionals 
- IT managers and professionals 
- Nontechnical general business managers and professionals 
Through a process of constructive debate, these three professional groups work to 
find consensus on an overall plan to protect the organization’s information assets 
(Dzazali and Hovden, 2009).  
The communities of interest fulfil the following roles: 
- The information security community protects the organization’s information 
assets from the many threats they face. 
- The information technology community supports the business objectives of 
the organization by supplying and supporting IT appropriate to the business’ 
needs. 
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- The nontechnical general business community articulates and communicates 
organizational policy and objectives and allocates resources to the other 
groups. 
Information security management is one of these three communities of interest 
functioning in most organizations. As part of the management team, it operates like 
all other management units by using the common characteristics of leadership and 
management. However, the goals and objectives of the information security 
management team differ from those of the IT and general management communities 
in that they are focused on the secure operation of the organization. Because 
information security management is charged with taking responsibility for a 
specialized program, certain characteristics of its management are unique to this 
community of interest. These unique features extend the basic characteristics of 
general leadership and management (Amitava and Rahul, 2008). 
The extended characteristics of information security are known as the six Ps. Each 
defined and examined below. 
Planning: 
Planning in InfoSec management is an extension of the basic planning model. 
Included in the InfoSec planning model are activities necessary to support the design, 
creation, and implementation of information security strategies, as they exist within 
the IT planning environment (Whitman and Mattord, 2007).  
Policy: 
The set of organizational guidelines that dictates behavior within the organization is 
called policy. In InfoSec, there are three general categories of policy:  
- Enterprise information security policy (EISP) sets the tone for the InfoSec 
department and the InfoSec climate across the organization. 
- Issue-specific security policies (ISSP) are sets of rules that define acceptable 
behavior within a specific technology, such as e-mail or Internet usage. 
- System-specific policies (SysSPs) are technical and/or managerial in nature 
and control the configuration and/or use of a piece of equipment or 
technology. 
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Programs: 
Programs are the operations conducted within InfoSec, which are specifically 
managed as separate entities. 
Protection: 
The protection function is executed via a set of risk management activities, including 
risk assessment and control, as well as protection mechanisms, technologies, and 
tools. Each of these mechanisms represents some aspect of the management of 
specific controls in the overall information security plan (Whitman and Mattord, 
2007).  
People: 
People are the most critical link in the information security program. It is impressive 
that managers continuously recognize the crucial role that people play in the 
information security program. 
Project Management: 
The final component is the application of thorough project management discipline to 
all elements of the information security program. Whether the task is to roll out a 
new security-training program or to select and implement a new firewall, it is 
important that the process be managed as a project (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
1.4 The Benefits of Using an ISMS  
By using ISMS, an organization can be sure that they are measuring and managing 
their information security processes in a structured manner and that they can control 
and hone their system to meet their business needs. If they draw from a standardized 
ISMS framework they can be sure that, they are drawing from the experience of 
many others and that the system has been reviewed and reflects best practices. Such a 
framework is a tried and tested tool that helps management ensure that security-
resource is spent on the most effective areas for the business (Ashenden, 2008). 
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2. PLANNING FOR SECURITY 
2.1 Organizing for Security 
2.1.1 The Role of Planning 
Planning usually involves many interrelated groups and organizational processes. 
The groups involved in planning represent the three communities (information 
security, information technology and general business) of interest; they may be 
internal or external to the organization, and can include employees, management, 
stockholders, and other outside stakeholders. Among the other factors that affect 
planning are the physical environment, the political and legal environment, the 
competitive environment, and the technological environment (Choi et al., 2008). 
Planning is the dominant means of managing resources in modern organizations. It 
entails the enumeration of a sequence of actions intended to achieve specific goals 
during a defined period of time, and then controlling the implementation of these 
steps. Planning provides direction for the organization's future. Without specific and 
detailed planning, organizational units would attempt to meet objectives 
independently, with each unit being guided by its own initiatives and ideas. Such an 
uncoordinated effort will not only fail to meet objectives, but will also result in an 
inefficient use of resources.  
Organizational planning, when conducted by the various segments of the 
organization, provides a uniform script that increases efficiency and reduces waste 
and duplication of effort by each organizational unit within the individual 
communities of interest. 
The primary goal of the organizational planning process is the creation of detailed 
plans—that is, systematic directions on how to meet the organization's objectives. 
This task is accomplished with a process that begins with the general and ends with 
the specific (Doherty and Fulford, 2006). 
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2.1.2 Precursors to Planning 
To implement effective planning, an organization's leaders should first have 
developed positions that explicitly state the organization's ethical, entrepreneurial, 
and philosophical perspectives. In recent years, the critical nature of the first of these 
perspectives—the ethical perspective—has come sharply into focus. Events such as 
the widely publicized problems at Enron and WorldCom, among others, illustrate the 
importance of an organization having solid and well-articulated ethical 
underpinnings. While ethical failures of this magnitude are exceptional, many 
organizations have begun to review critically the documents that establish their 
ethical foundations. 
When an organization's stated positions do not match the demonstrated ethical, 
entrepreneurial, and philosophical approaches of its management teams, the 
developmental plan, which is guided by its mission statement, vision, values, and 
strategy, becomes unmanageable (Filipek, 2007). 
2.1.2.1 Values Statement 
The first position that management must articulate is found in the values statement. 
The trust and confidence of stakeholders and the public are important factors for any 
organization. By establishing a formal set of organizational principles and qualities 
in a values statement, as well as benchmarks for measuring behavior against these 
published values, an organization makes its conduct and performance standards clear 
to its employees and the public. The quality management movement of the 1980s and 
1990s amply illustrated that organizations with strong values can earn greater loyalty 
from customers and employees (Fernando, 2009). 
2.1.2.2 Vision Statement 
The second underpinning of organizational planning is the vision statement. In 
contrast to the mission statement, which expresses what the organization is, the 
vision statement expresses what the organization wants to become. Vision statements 
should therefore be ambitious; after all, they are meant to express the aspirations of 
the organization and to serve as a means for visualizing its future. In other words, the 
vision statement is the best-case scenario for the organization's future. Many 
organizations mix or combine the vision statement and the mission statement.  
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2.1.2.3 Mission Statement 
The mission statement explicitly declares the business of the organization and its 
intended areas of operations. A mission statement should be concise, should reflect 
both internal and external operations, and should be robust enough to remain valid 
for a period of four to six years. The mission statement must explain what the 
organization does and for whom (Lorenzeti, 2009). 
2.1.3 Strategic Planning 
Strategy or strategic planning, lays out the long-term direction to be taken by the 
organization. Strategic planning guides organizational efforts, and focuses resources 
toward specific, clearly defined goals, in the midst of an ever-changing environment 
(Chang and Ho, 2006). 
2.1.3.1 Creating a Strategic Plan 
After an organization develops a general strategy, it must create an overall strategic 
plan by extending that general strategy into specific strategic plans for major 
divisions. Each level of each division translates those objectives into more specific.  
The translation of goals from the strategic level to the next lower level is perhaps 
more art than science. It relies on the executive's ability to know and understand the 
strategic goals of the entire organization, to know and appreciate the strategic and 
tactical abilities of each unit within the organization, and to negotiate with peers, 
superiors, and subordinates. This mix of skills helps to achieve the proper balance in 
articulating goals that fall within performance capabilities (Onwubiko and Lenaghan, 
2009).  
2.1.3.2 Planning Levels 
Once the organization's overall strategic plan is translated into strategic goals for 
each major division or operation, the next step is to translate these strategies into 
tasks with specific, measurable, achievable, and time-bound objectives. Strategic 
planning then begins a transformation from general, sweeping statements toward 
more specific and applied objectives. Strategic plans are used to create tactical plans, 
which are in turn used to develop operational plans.  
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Tactical planning has a more short-term focus than strategic planning, usually one to 
three years. It breaks down each applicable strategic goal into a series of incremental 
objectives. Each objective should be specific and ideally will have a delivery date 
within a year. Budgeting, resource allocation, and personnel are critical components 
of the tactical plan (Tsohou et al., 2008).  
2.1.4 Planning For Information Security Implementation 
The CIO and CISO play important roles in translating overall strategic planning into 
tactical and operational information security plans. Depending on the information 
security function's placement within the organizational chart, the roles of the CIO 
and the CISO may differ. Most commonly, the CISO directly reports to the CIO. In 
that case, the CIO charges the CISO and other IT department heads with creating and 
adopting plans that are consistent and supportive of the entire organizational strategy.  
Once the organization's overall strategic plan has been translated into IT and 
information security departmental objectives by the CIO, and then further translated 
into tactical and operational plans by the CISO, the implementation of information 
security can begin. 
Implementation of information security can be accomplished in two ways: bottom-up 
or top-down. The bottom-up approach might begin as a grass-roots effort in which 
systems administrators attempt to improve the security of their systems.  
The top-down approach, in contrast, features strong upper-management support, a 
dedicated champion, usually assured funding, a clear planning and implementation 
process, and the ability to influence organizational culture. High-level managers 
provide resources; give direction; issue policies, procedures, and processes; dictate 
the goals and expected outcomes of the project; and determine who is accountable 
for each of the required actions. The most successful top-down approach also 
incorporates a formal development strategy referred to as the systems development 
life cycle (Zhou et al., 2005). 
2.2 Planning for Contingencies 
Because technology drives business, planning for an unexpected event usually 
involves managers from both the information technology and information security 
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communities of interest, who analyze the entire technological infrastructure of the 
organization under the mission statement and current organizational objectives.  
For a plan to gain the support of all members of the organization, it must also be 
sanctioned and actively supported by the general business community of interest 
(Cribb and Rao, 2003). 
2.2.1 What is Contingency Planning 
The overall process of preparing for unexpected events is called contingency 
planning (CP). CP is the process by which the information technology and 
information security communities of interest position their respective organizational 
units to prepare for, detect, react to, and recover from events that threaten the 
security of information resources and assets, both human and natural. The main goal 
of CP is to restore normal modes of operation with minimal cost and disruption to 
normal business activities after an unexpected event—in other words, to make sure 
things get back to the way they were within a reasonable period of time. Ideally, CP 
should ensure the continuous availability of information systems to the organization 
even in the face of the unexpected (Qu and Zhang, 2007).  
CP consists of four major components: 
- Business impact analysis (BIA) 
- Incident response plan (IR plan) 
- Disaster recovery plan (DR plan) 
- Business continuity plan (BC plan) 
The BIA, a preparatory activity common to both CP and risk management, helps the 
organization determine which business functions and information systems are the 
most critical to the success of the organization. The IR plan focuses on the immediate 
response to an incident. Any unexpected event is treated as an incident, unless and 
until a response team deems it to be a disaster. Then the DR plan, which focuses on 
restoring operations at the primary site, is invoked. If operations at the primary site 
cannot be quickly restored, the BC plan occurs concurrently with the DR plan, 
enabling the business to continue at an alternate site, until the organization is able to 
resume operations at its primary site or select a new primary location (Choi et al., 
2007). 
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2.2.2 Components of Contingency Planning  
CP includes four major components: the business impact analysis, and incident 
response, disaster recovery, and business continuity plans. Whether an organization 
adopts the one-plan method or the multiple-plan method with interlocking proce-
dures, each of these CP components must be addressed and developed in its entirety.  
2.2.2.1 Business Impact Analysis 
The business impact analysis (BIA), the first phase in the CP process, provides the 
CP team with information about systems and the threats they face. The BIA is a 
crucial component of the initial planning stages, as it provides detailed scenarios of 
the effects that each potential attack could have on the organization (Moreira et al., 
2008). 
The CP team conducts the BIA in the following stages: 
- Threat attack identification and prioritization 
- Business unit analysis 
- Attack success scenario development 
- Potential damage assessment 
- Subordinate plan classification 
2.2.2.2 Incident Response Plan 
The incident response plan (IR plan) comprises a detailed set of processes and 
procedures that anticipate, detect, and mitigate the effects of an unexpected event 
that might compromise information resources and assets. Incident response planning 
(IRP) is therefore the preparation for such an event. In CP, an unexpected event is 
called an incident. An incident occurs when an attack (natural or human-made) 
affects information resources and/or assets, causing actual damage or other 
disruptions. Incident response (IR), then, is a set of procedures that commence when 
an incident is detected. IR must be carefully planned and coordinated because 
organizations heavily depend on the quick and efficient containment and resolution 
of incidents. The IR plan is usually activated when an incident causes minimal 
damage—according to criteria set in advance by the organization—with little or no 
disruption to business operations (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
 17 
2.2.2.3 Disaster Recovery Plan 
The next vital part of contingency planning is disaster recovery planning. The IT 
community of interest, under the leadership of the CIO, is often made responsible for 
disaster recovery planning, including aspects that are not necessarily technology-
based. 
Disaster recovery planning (DRP) entails the preparation for and recovery from a 
disaster, whether natural or human-made. In some cases, actual incidents detected by 
the IR team may escalate to the level of disaster, and the IR plan may no longer be 
able to handle the effective and efficient recovery from the loss. For example, if a 
malicious program evades containment actions and infects and disables many or 
most of an organization's systems and its ability to function, the disaster recovery 
plan (DR plan) is activated. Sometimes events are by their nature immediately 
classified as disasters, such as an extensive fire, flood, damaging storm, or 
earthquake (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
2.2.2.4 Business Continuity Plan 
Business continuity planning (BCP) ensures that critical business functions can 
continue if a disaster occurs. Unlike the DR plan, which is usually managed by the IT 
community of interest, the CEO of an organization most properly manages the 
business continuity plan (BC plan). The BC plan is activated and executed 
concurrently with the DR plan when the disaster is major or long term and requires 
fuller and complex restoration of information and IT resources. If a disaster has 
rendered the current business location unusable, there must be a plan to allow the 
business to continue to function. While the BC plan re-establishes critical business 
functions at an alternate site, the DR plan team focuses on the reestablishment of the 
technical infrastructure and business operations at the primary site. Not every 
business needs such a plan, or such facilities. Some small companies or fiscally 
sound organizations may be able simply to cease operations until the primary 
facilities are restored. Manufacturing and retail organizations, however, depend on 
continued operations for revenue. Thus, these entities must have a BG plan in place 
to relocate operations quickly with minimal loss of revenue (Whitman and Mattord, 
2007). 
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2.2.2.5 Timing and Sequence of Contingency Planning Elements 
The IR plan focuses on immediate response, but if the incident escalates into a 
disaster, the IR plan may give way to the DR plan and BC plan. The DR plan 
typically focuses on restoring systems after disasters occur, and therefore is closely 
associated with the BC plan. The BC plan occurs concurrently with the DR plan 
when the damage is major or long term, requiring more than simple restoration of 
information and information resources. 
Some experts argue that the three planning components (the IR, DR, and BC plans) 
of CP are so closely linked that they are indistinguishable. In fact, each has a distinct 
place, role, and planning requirement. Furthermore, each component (IR, DR, and 
BC) comes into play at a specific time in the life of an incident (Dzazali et al., 2009). 
2.3 Information Security Policy  
There are various controls and measures that can be implemented within an 
organization to ensure the effective working of information security. These controls 
and measures range from technical solutions and contractual regulations to 
organizational awareness of current risks, threats and vulnerabilities. Undoubtedly, 
the singularly most important of these controls is the information security policy 
(Höne and Eloff, 2002). 
The information security policy is a direction-giving document for information 
security within an organization. It is a document that indicates management’s 
commitment to and support of information security, as well as defining the role 
information security has to play in reaching and supporting the organization’s vision 
and mission. In essence, the information security policy is documented to explain the 
need for information security to all of the organization’s information resource users. 
It should complement the organization’s business objectives and reflect 
management’s willingness to operate the organization in a controlled and secure 
manner (Doherty et al., 2009). 
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2.4 Security Management Models and Practices 
The communities of interest, that are accountable for the security of an organization's 
information assets must design a working security plan, and then implement a 
management model to execute and maintain that plan. This effort may begin with the 
creation or validation of a security framework, followed by the development of an 
information security blueprint that describes existing controls and identifies other 
necessary security controls. The terms blueprint and framework are closely related. A 
framework is the outline of the more thorough blueprint, which sets out the model to 
be followed in the creation of the design, selection, and the initial and ongoing 
implementation of all subsequent security controls, including information security 
policies, security education and training programs, and technological controls 
(Knapp, 2006). 
To generate a security blueprint, most organizations draw on established security 
models and practices. A security model is a generic blueprint offered by a service 
organization. The model you choose must be flexible, scalable, robust, and 
sufficiently detailed. 
Another way to create a blueprint is to look at the paths taken by other organizations. 
In this land of benchmarking, you follow the recommended practices or industry 
standards. Benchmarking can provide details on which controls should be 
considered, but it does not provide implementation details that explain how controls 
should be put into action. 
One way to select a methodology is to adapt or adopt an existing security 
management model or set of practices. Because each information security 
environment is unique, you may need to modify or adapt portions of several 
frameworks—what works well for one organization may not precisely fit another 
(Ilan, 2008). 
2.4.1 Security Management Models 
Many security management models and practices are available as are the number of 
consultants who offer them. Among the most accessible places to find a quality 
security management model are U.S. federal agencies and international 
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organizations. In fact, one of the most popular security management models has been 
ratified into an international standard. The International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
jointly issued International Standard 17799 and its companion document 27001, each 
of which addresses a related area of security management practice (Gray, 2003): 
- ISO/IEC 17799:2005 Information Technology—Security Techniques—Code 
of Practice for Information Security Management 
- ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management: Specification with 
Guidance for Use 
These documents are proprietary. Organizations wanting to adopt the model must 
purchase the rights to do so (Humphreys, 2008). 
2.4.1.1 ISO/IEC 17799:2005 Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management 
ISO/IEC 17799 is one of the most widely referenced and often discussed security 
models. It is based on the British standard Information Technology—Code of 
Practice for Information Security Management, which was originally published as 
British Standard 7799. The British code of practice was adopted as an international 
standard framework for information security by the ISO and the IEC as ISO/IEC 
17799:2002 (Kritzinger and Smith, 2008).  
In 2005, ISO/IEC 17799:2002 was updated to ISO/IEC 17799:2005 Information 
Technology—Security Techniques—Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management. The stated purpose of ISO/IEC 17799: 2005 is to establish guidelines 
and general principles for initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving 
information security management in an organization. The objectives outlined provide 
general guidance on the commonly accepted goals of information security 
management. ISO/IEC 17799:2005 contains recommended practices of control 
objectives and controls in the following areas of information security management: 
- Security policy 
- Organization of information security 
- Asset management 
- Human resources security 
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- Physical and environmental security 
- Communications and operations management 
- Access control 
- Information systems acquisition, development, and maintenance 
- Information security incident management 
- Business continuity management 
- Compliance 
The control objectives and controls in ISO/IEC 17799:2005 are intended to be 
implemented to meet the requirements identified by a risk assessment. ISO/IEC 
17799:2005 is intended as a common basis and practical guideline for developing 
organizational security standards and effective security management practices, and to 
help build confidence in inter-organizational activities (Niekerk and Solms, 2009). 
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 includes 133 possible controls, not all of which must be used 
by every organization. Part of the security model selection process is to identify 
which are relevant. Some of the topics include provision of outsourcing, external 
service delivery, and patch management. Other areas have been modified and 
improved, including employment termination and mobile/distributed communication. 
In addition to revising the content itself, the document has also had its "user 
friendliness" improved, making the standard much more understandable for the 
average businessperson or IT professional. Each section of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 
includes four categories of information: 
- One or more objectives 
- Controls relevant to the achievement of the objectives 
- Implementation guidance 
- Other information 
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 is actually the latest evolution of the original two-volume 
British Standard BS 7799. BS 7799 offered an overview of the various areas of 
security and provided information on 127 controls over 10 broad areas. Volume 2 
provided information on how to implement Volume 1 and how to set up an 
Information Security Management Structure (ISMS). In the United Kingdom, these 
standards, when implemented correctly, are used to obtain the ISMS certification and 
accreditation, as determined by a BS 7799-certified evaluator. Many countries, 
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including the United States, Germany, and Japan, have not formally adopted 
ISO/IEC 17799 as national policy, however. Groups within each of these countries 
claim that the methodology has some fundamental flaws: 
- The global information security community has not defined any justification 
for a code of practice as identified in ISO/IEC 17799. 
- ISO/IEC 17799 lacks the necessary measurement precision of a technical 
standard. 
- There is no reason to believe that ISO/IEC 17799 is more useful than any 
other approach. 
- ISO/IEC 17799 is not as complete as other frameworks. 
- ISO/IEC 17799 is perceived as having been hurriedly prepared, given the tre-
mendous impact that its adoption could have on industry information security 
controls. 
After all, 17799 is only 115 pages long, with its companion (27001) only 34 pages 
long. The NIST counterparts' page counts number in the thousands. 
With the release of the 2005 version, certain issues may be resolved. Some industry 
experts predict that the 17799 document will be renumbered to ISO/IEC 27002 to 
align it more closely with the newest version of its companion document, ISO/IEC 
27001 (Fingerman, 2008).  
2.4.1.1.1 ISO/IEC 17799:2005 Clauses and Controls 
A.5 Security policy 
 
A.5.1 Information security policy 
Management should define a policy to clarify their direction of, and support for, 
information security, meaning a short, high-level information security policy 
statement laying down the key information security directives and mandates for the 
entire organization.  This is normally supported by a comprehensive suite of more 
detailed corporate information security policies, typically in the form of an 
information security policy manual.  The policy manual in turn is supported by a set 
of information security standards, procedures and guidelines (Knapp et al., 2009). 
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A.6 Organization of information security 
A suitable information security governance structure should be designed and 
implemented. 
A.6.1 Internal organization 
The organization should have a management framework for information security. 
Senior management should provide direction and commit their support, for example 
by approving information security policies. Roles and responsibilities should be 
defined for the information security function. Other relevant functions should 
cooperate and coordinate their activities.  IT facilities should be authorized.  
Confidentiality agreements should reflect the organization’s needs.  Contacts should 
be established with relevant authorities (e.g. law enforcement) and special interest 
groups.  Information security should be independently reviewed (Valdevit et al., 
2009). 
A.6.2 External parties 
Information security should not be compromised by the introduction of third party 
products or services.  Risks should be assessed and mitigated. when dealing with 
customers and in third party agreements. 
A.7 Asset management 
The organization should be in a position to understand what information assets it 
holds, and to manage their security appropriately. 
A.7.1 Responsibility for assets 
All information assets should be accounted for and have a nominated owner.  An 
inventory of information assets (IT hardware, software, data, system documentation, 
storage media, supporting assets such as computer room air conditioners and UPSs, 
and ICT services) should be maintained. The inventory should record ownership and 
location of the assets, and owners should identify acceptable uses. 
A.7.2 Information classification 
Information should be classified according to its need for security protection and 
labelled accordingly.   
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A.8 Human resources security 
The organization should manage system access rights etc. for ‘joiners, movers and 
leavers’, and should undertake suitable security awareness, training and educational 
activities (Lineberry, 2007). 
A.8.1 Prior to employment 
Security responsibilities should be taken into account when recruiting permanent 
employees, contractors and temporary staff (e.g. through adequate job descriptions, 
pre-employment screening) and included in contracts (e.g. terms and conditions of 
employment and other signed agreements on security roles and responsibilities). 
A.8.2 During employment 
Management responsibilities regarding information security should be defined. 
Employees and (if relevant) third party IT users should be made aware, educated and 
trained in security procedures.  A formal disciplinary process is necessary to handle 
security breaches. 
A.8.3 Termination or change of employment 
Security aspects of a person’s exit from the organization (e.g. the return of corporate 
assets and removal of access rights) or change of responsibilities should be managed. 
A.9 Physical and environmental security 
Valuable IT equipment should be physically protected against malicious or 
accidental damage or loss, overheating, loss of mains power etc. 
A.9.1 Secure areas 
This section describes the need for concentric layers of physical controls to protect 
sensitive IT facilities from unauthorized access. 
A.9.2 Equipment security 
Critical IT equipment, cabling and so on should be protected against physical 
damage, fire, flood, theft etc., both on- and off-site. Power supplies and cabling 
should be secured. IT equipment should be maintained properly and disposed of 
securely. 
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A.10 Communications and operations management 
This lengthy, detailed section of the standard describes security controls for systems 
and network management. 
A.10.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities 
IT operating responsibilities and procedures should be documented. Changes to IT 
facilities and systems should be controlled. Duties should be segregated between 
different people where relevant (e.g. access to development and operational systems 
should be segregated). 
A.10.2 Third party service delivery management 
Security requirements should be taken into account in third party service delivery 
(e.g. IT facilities management or outsourcing), from contractual terms to ongoing 
monitoring and change management. 
A.10.3 System planning and acceptance 
Covers IT capacity planning and production acceptance processes. 
A.10.4 Protection against malicious and mobile code 
Describes the need for anti-malware controls, including user awareness.  Security 
controls for mobile code ‘associated with a number of middleware services’ are also 
outlined. 
A.10.5 Back-up 
Covers routine data backups and rehearsed restoration. 
A.10.6 Network security management 
Outlines secure network management, network security monitoring and other 
controls.  Also covers security of commercial network services such as private 
networks and managed firewalls etc. 
A.10.7 Media handling 
Operating procedures should be defined to protect documents and computer media 
containing data, system information etc. Disposal of backup media, documents, voice 
and other recordings, test data etc. should be logged and controlled. Procedures 
should be defined for securely handling, transporting and storing backup media and 
system documentation. 
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A.10.8 Exchange of information  
Information exchanges between organizations should be controlled, for example 
though policies and procedures, and legal agreements. Information exchanges should 
also comply with applicable legislation. Security procedures and standards should be 
in place to protect information and physical media in transit, including electronic 
messaging (e-mail, EDI and IM) and business information systems. 
A.10.9 Electronic commerce services 
The security implications of e-commerce (online transaction systems) should be 
evaluated and suitable controls implemented.  The integrity and availability of 
information published online (e.g. on websites) should also be protected. 
A.10.10 Monitoring 
Covers security event/audit/fault logging and system alarm/alert monitoring to detect 
unauthorized use.  Also covers the need to secure logs and synchronize system 
clocks. 
A.11 Access control 
Logical access to IT systems, networks and data must be suitably controlled to 
prevent unauthorized use.  This is another lengthy and detailed section. 
A.11.1 Business requirement for access control 
The organization’s requirements to control access to information assets should be 
clearly documented in an access control policy, including for example job-related 
access profiles (role based access control).   
A.11.2 User access management 
The allocation of access rights to users should be formally controlled through user 
registration and administration procedures (from initial user registration through to 
removal of access rights when no longer required), including special restrictions over 
the allocation of privileges and management of passwords, and regular access rights 
reviews. 
A.11.3 User responsibilities 
Users should be made aware of their responsibilities towards maintaining effective 
access controls e.g. choosing strong passwords and keeping them confidential. 
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Systems and information should be secured when left unattended (e.g. clear desk and 
clear screen policies). 
A.11.4 Network access control 
Access to network services should be controlled, both within the organization and 
between organizations. Policy should be defined and remote users (and possibly 
equipment) should be suitably authenticated.  Remote diagnostic ports should be 
securely controlled. Information services, users and systems should be segregated 
into separate logical network domains.  Network connections and routine should be 
controlled where necessary.   
A.11.5 Operating system access control 
Operating system access control facilities and utilities (such as user authentication 
with unique user IDs and managed passwords, recording use of privileges and system 
security alarms) should be used. Access to powerful system utilities should be 
controlled and inactivity timeouts should be applied. 
A.11.6 Application and information access control 
Access to and within application systems should be controlled in accordance with a 
defined access control policy. Particularly sensitive applications may require 
dedicated (isolated) platforms, and/or additional controls if run on shared platforms. 
A.11.7 Mobile computing and teleworking 
There should be formal policies covering the secure use of portable PCs, PDAs, cell 
phones etc., and secure teleworking (“working from home”, “road warriors” and 
other forms of mobile or remote working). 
A.12 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance 
Information security must be taken into account in the Systems Development 
Lifecycle (SDLC) processes for specifying, building/acquiring, testing, 
implementing and maintaining IT systems. 
A.12.1 Security requirements of information systems 
Automated and manual security control requirements should be analyzed and fully 
identified during the requirements stage of the systems development or acquisition 
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process, and incorporated into business cases.  Purchased software should be 
formally tested for security, and any issues risk-assessed. 
A.12.2 Correct processing in application systems 
Data entry, processing and output validation controls and message authentication 
should be provided to mitigate the associated integrity risks. 
A.12.3 Cryptographic controls 
A cryptography policy should be defined, covering roles and responsibilities, digital 
signatures, non-repudiation, management of keys and digital certificates etc. 
A.12.4 Security of system files 
Access to system files (both executable programs and source code) and test data 
should be controlled. 
A.12.5 Security in development and support processes 
Application system managers should be responsible for controlling access to 
development project and support environments.  Formal change control processes 
should be applied, including technical reviews.  Packaged applications should ideally 
not be modified. Checks should be made for information leakage for example via 
covert channels and Trojans if these are a concern. A number of supervisory and 
monitoring controls are outlined for outsourced development. 
A.12.6 Technical vulnerability management 
Technical vulnerabilities in systems and applications should be controlled by 
monitoring for the announcement of relevant security vulnerabilities, and risk-
assessing and applying relevant security patches promptly. 
A.13 Information security incident management 
Information security events, incidents and weaknesses (including near-misses) 
should be promptly reported and properly managed. 
A.13.1 Reporting in information security events and weaknesses 
An incident reporting/alarm procedure is required, plus the associated response and 
escalation procedures.  There should be a central point of contact, and all employees, 
contractors etc. should be informed of their incident reporting responsibilities. 
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A.13.2 Management of information security incidents and improvements 
Responsibilities and procedures are required to manage incidents consistently and 
effectively, to implement continuous improvement (learning the lessons), and to 
collect forensic evidence. 
A.14 Business continuity management 
 
A.14.1 Information security aspects of business continuity management 
This section describes the relationship between IT disaster recovery planning, 
business continuity management and contingency planning, ranging from analysis 
and documentation through to regular exercising/testing of the plans.  These controls 
are designed to minimize the impact of security incidents that happen despite the 
preventive controls noted elsewhere in the standard. 
A.15 Compliance 
 
A.15.1 Compliance with legal requirements 
The organization must comply with applicable legislation such as copyright, data 
protection, and protection of financial data and other vital records, cryptography 
restrictions, rules of evidence etc. 
A.15.2 Compliance with security policies and standards, and technical 
compliance 
Managers and system owners must ensure compliance with security policies and 
standards, for example through regular platform security reviews, penetration tests 
etc. undertaken by competent testers. 
A.15.3 Information systems audit considerations 
Audits should be carefully planned to minimize disruption to operational systems. 
Powerful audit tools/facilities must also be protected against unauthorized use. 
2.4.1.2 ISO/IEC 27001:2005: Information Security Management System 
The predecessor to 17799 is BS 7799:1, the companion to that document is BS 
7799:2. Part 2 of BS 7799 provides implementation details using a Plan-Do-Check-
Act cycle (Nelson, 2006). 
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Plan: 
- Define the scope of the ISMS. 
- Define an ISMS policy. 
- Define the approach to risk assessment. 
- Identify the risks. 
- Assess the risks. 
- Identify and evaluate options for the treatment of risk. 
- Select control objectives and controls.  
- Prepare a Statement of Applicability (SOA). 
Do: 
- Formulate a Risk Treatment Plan. 
- Implement the Risk Treatment Plan.  
- Implement controls. 
- Implement training and awareness programs.  
- Manage operations. 
- Manage resources. 
- Implement procedures to detect and respond to security incidents. 
Check: 
- Execute monitoring procedures. 
- Undertake regular reviews of ISMS effectiveness. 
- Review the level of residual and acceptable risk. 
- Conduct internal ISMS audits. 
- Undertake regular management review of the ISMS. 
- Record actions and events that impact an ISMS. 
Act: 
- Implement identified improvements. 
- Take corrective or preventive action. 
- Apply lessons learned. 
- Communicate results to interested parties. 
- Ensure improvements achieve objectives. 
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Although Part 2 provides some implementation information, it simply specifies what 
must be done—not how to do it. As noted by Gamma Secure Systems, a well-
regarded British security consulting firm that has participated in the ISO/IEC 197799 
and British Standard 7799 process since they began, "The standard has an appendix 
that gives guidance on the use of the standard, in particular to expand on the Plan-
Do-Check-Act concept. It is important to realize that there will be many Plan-Do-
Check-Act cycles within single ISMS, all operating asynchronously at different 
speeds." 
In 2005, with the release of the latest iteration of ISO/IEC 17799, a version of BS 
7799:2 was also updated and codified as ISO/IEC 27001:2005 Information 
Technology—Security Techniques—Information Security Management Systems—
Requirements. This document is the foundation for third-party certification. Its major 
sections include (Saint-Germain, 2005): 
- Introduction 
- Scope 
- Terms and definitions 
- Normative references 
- ISMS 
- Management responsibility 
- Management review 
- ISMS improvement 
According to ISO, the proposed use of ISO/IEC 27001:2005 is for: 
- use within organizations to formulate security requirements and objectives; 
- use within organizations as a way to ensure that security risks are managed 
cost-effectively; 
- use within organizations to ensure compliance with laws and regulations; 
- use within an organization as a process framework for the implementation 
and management of controls to ensure that the specific security objectives of 
an organization are met; 
- definition of new information security management processes; 
- identification and clarification of existing information security management 
processes; 
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- use by the management of organizations to determine the status of informa-
tion security management activities; 
- use by the internal and external auditors of organizations to determine the 
degree of compliance with the policies, directives, and standards adopted by 
an organization; 
- use by organizations to provide relevant information about information 
security policies, directives, standards, and procedures to trading partners and 
other organizations with whom they interact for operational or commercial 
reasons; 
- implementation of business-enabling information security; 
- use by organizations to provide relevant information about information secu-
rity to customers. 
ISO/IEC 27001, much like its predecessor BS 7799, is primarily intended to be used 
by an organization to seek certification. Thus, it serves best as an assessment tool 
rather than an implementation framework (Saleh et al., 2007). 
2.4.1.3 NIST Security Models 
Other approaches to structuring information security management are described in 
the many documents available from NIST's Computer Security Resource Center 
(http://csrc. nist.gov). These documents, which are among the references cited by the 
U.S. government as reasons not to adopt ISO/IEC 17799 standards, enjoy two 
notable advantages over many other sources of security information: (1) they are 
publicly available at no charge and (2) they have been available for some time and 
thus have been broadly reviewed by government and industry professionals. NIST 
SP documents help to design a custom security framework for the organization's 
information security program (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
2.4.1.4 COBIT 
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) also provides 
advice about the implementation of sound controls and control objectives for 
information security. This document can be used not only as a planning tool for 
information security, but also as a controls model. The Information Systems Audit 
and Control Association (ISACA), and the IT Governance Institute (ITGI) created 
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COBIT in 1992. Documentation on COBIT was first published in 1996, and was 
updated in 1998, 2000, 2003, and most recently in December 2005.  
COBIT is an IT governance framework and supporting toolset that allows managers 
to bridge the gap between control requirements, technical issues, and business risks. 
COBIT enables clear policy development and good practice for IT control 
throughout organizations. ITGI's latest version—COBIT 4.0—emphasizes regulatory 
compliance, helps organizations to increase the value attained from IT, enables 
alignment, and simplifies implementation of the COBIT framework. It does not 
invalidate work done based on earlier versions of COBIT but instead can be used to 
enhance work already done based upon those earlier versions. When major activities 
are planned for IT governance initiatives, or when an overhaul of the enterprise 
control framework is anticipated, it is recommended to start fresh with COBIT 4.0. 
COBIT 4.0 presents activities in a more streamlined and practical manner so 
continuous improvement in IT governance is easier than ever to achieve. 
COBIT presents 34 high-level objectives that cover 215 control objectives. The 
control objectives are categorized into four domains: plan and organize, acquire and 
implement, deliver and support, and monitor and evaluate (Herath and Rao, 2010).  
2.4.1.5 COSO 
Another controls-based model, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO), is a U.S. private-sector initiative, formed in 1985. 
Its major objective is to identify the factors that cause fraudulent financial reporting 
and to make recommendations to reduce its incidence. COSO has established a 
common definition of internal controls, standards, and criteria against which 
companies and organizations can assess their control systems.14 COSO helps 
organizations comply with critical regulations like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
COSO Definitions and Key Concepts: 
According to COSO, internal control is a process, effected by an entity's board of 
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: 
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- Effectiveness and efficiency of operations 
- Reliability of financial reporting 
- Compliance with applicable laws and regulations 
COSO's key concepts include the following: 
- "Internal control is a process. It is a means to an end, not an end in itself. 
- People affect internal control. It's not merely policy manuals and forms, but 
people at every level of an organization. 
- Internal control can be expected to provide only reasonable assurance, not 
absolute assurance, to an entity's management and board. 
- Internal control is geared to the achievement of objectives in one or more 
separate but overlapping categories." 
COSO Framework: 
The COSO framework is built on five interrelated components. Again, while COSO 
is designed as a framework to describe and analyze internal control systems, part of 
those internal controls systems are on IT systems that incorporate information 
security controls. COSO's five components are (Whitman and Mattord, 2007): 
- Control environment—the foundation of all internal control components. 
Environmental factors include the integrity, ethical values, management's 
operating style, delegation of authority systems, as well as the processes for 
managing and developing people in the organization. 
- Risk assessment—based on the establishment of objectives, risk assessment 
assists in the identification and examination of valid risks to objectives, as 
well as information. 
- Control activities—including the policies and procedures to support manage-
ment directives. These activities occur throughout the organization and 
include approvals, authorizations, verifications, reconciliations, reviews of 
operating performance, security of assets, and segregation of duties. 
- Information and communication—responsible for the delivery of reports, 
regulatory, financial, and otherwise. Effective communication should also 
include third parties and other stakeholders. 
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- Monitoring—continuous or discrete activities to ensure internal control 
systems are functioning as expected. Internal control deficiencies detected 
through these monitoring activities should be reported upstream and correc-
tive actions should be taken to ensure continuous improvement of the system. 
2.4.2 Security Management Practices 
In information security, two categories of benchmarks are used: standards of due 
care/due diligence, and recommended practices. Recommended practices include a 
subcategory of practices—the so-called gold standard—that are generally regarded as 
"the best of the best" (Brotby, 2009). 
2.4.2.1 Standards of Due Care/Due Diligence 
For legal reasons, an organization may be compelled to adopt a certain minimum 
level of security. When organizations adopt minimum levels of security to anticipate 
a future legal defense, they may need to show that they have done what any prudent 
organization would do in similar circumstances; this is known as a standard of due 
care. Implementing controls at this minimum standard—and maintaining them—
demonstrates that an organization has performed due diligence. Although some argue 
that the two terms are interchangeable, the term due diligence encompasses a 
requirement that the implemented standards continue to provide the required level of 
protection. Failure to support a standard of due care or due diligence can expose an 
organization to legal liability, provided it can be shown that the organization was 
negligent in its application or lack of application of information protection. This is 
especially important when the organization maintains information about customers, 
including medical, legal, or other personal data (Ku et al., 2009). 
The information security protection environment that an organization must maintain 
can be large and complex. It may therefore be impossible to implement 
recommended practices in all categories. Based on the budget assigned to the 
protection of information, it may also be financially impossible to provide security 
levels on par with those offered by organizations that can spend more money on 
information security.  
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Some organizations might want to implement the best, most technologically 
advanced controls available, but for financial or other reasons cannot do so. 
Ultimately, it is counterproductive to establish costly, state-of-the-art security in one 
area, only to leave other areas exposed. Instead, organizations must make sure that 
they have met a reasonable level of security in all areas, and that they have 
adequately protected all information assets, before improving individual areas to 
meet the highest standards (Koskosas and Amancei, 2004). 
2.4.2.2 Recommended Security Practices 
Security efforts that seek to provide a superior level of performance in the protection 
of information are referred to as recommended business practices or sometimes 
called best practices. Security efforts that are among the best in the industry are 
termed best security practices (BSPs). These practices balance the need for 
information access with the need for adequate protection. They seek to provide as 
much security as possible for information and information systems while 
simultaneously demonstrating fiscal responsibility and ensuring ready information 
access. Of course, companies with best practices may not be the best in every area; 
they may have established an extremely high quality or successful security effort in 
only one area (Farn and Lin, 2004). 
2.4.3 Metrics in Information Security Management  
When an organization applies statistical and quantitative approaches of mathematical 
analysis to the process of measuring the activities and outcomes of the InfoSec 
program, it is using InfoSec metrics. InfoSec metrics enable organizations to measure 
the level of effort required to meet the stated objectives of the InfoSec program. 
Managing the use of InfoSec metrics requires commitment from the InfoSec manage-
ment team. This effort will consume resources including people's time, hardware 
cycles, and perhaps an investment in specialty software. The results of the effort will 
need to be periodically and consistently reviewed to make sure they remain relevant 
and useful (Hentea, 2007).  
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2.4.3.1 Specifying InfoSec Metrics 
The first task in the metrics process is to assess and quantify what will be measured. 
While InfoSec planning and organizing activities may only require time estimates, 
you must obtain more detailed measurements for the production level of effort and 
the project work. 
Production level statistics depend greatly on the number of systems and the number 
of users of those systems. As the number of systems changes and/or the number of 
users of those systems changes, the expected effort to maintain the same level of 
service will vary accordingly. Some organizations simply track these two values to 
measure the service being delivered. Other organizations need more detailed metrics, 
perhaps including the number of new users added, number of access control changes, 
number of users removed or deauthorized, number of access control violations, 
number of awareness briefings, number of systems by type, number of incidents by 
category (such as virus or worm outbreaks), number of malicious code instances 
blocked by filter, and many, many other possible measurements. 
Collecting project metrics may be even more challenging. Unless the organization is 
satisfied with a simple tally of who spent how many hours doing which tasks (this is 
more project management than metrics reporting), some mechanism to link the 
outcome of each project in terms of loss control or risk reduction to the resources 
consumed will be needed. This is a nontrivial process and most organizations rely on 
narrative explanation rather than measurement-driven calculations to justify project 
expenditures (Hazel, 2008). 
2.4.3.2 Collecting InfoSec Metrics 
The prospect of collecting metrics is daunting to some organizations. At larger 
organizations, merely counting the number of computing systems may be a time-
consuming project. Some thought must go into the processes used for data collection 
and record keeping. Once the question of what to measure is decided, the how, when, 
where, and who questions of metrics collection must be answered. Designing the 
collection process requires thoughtful consideration of the intent of the metric along 
with a thorough knowledge of how production services are delivered (Whitman and 
Mattord, 2007). 
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2.4.3.3 Interpreting InfoSec Metrics 
In most cases, simply listing the measurements collected does not adequately convey 
their meaning. For example, a line chart showing the number of malicious code 
attacks occurring per day may communicate a basic fact, but unless the reporting 
mechanism can provide the context—for example, the number of new malicious 
code variants on the Internet in that time period—the metric will not serve its 
intended purpose. In addition, you must make decisions about how to present 
correlated metrics—pie, line, bar, scatter, or bar charts—as well as colors to use to 
denote which kinds of results (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
2.4.3.4 Disseminating InfoSec Metrics 
The CISO must also consider to whom the results of the metrics program should be 
disseminated, and how they should be delivered. Many times the CISO presents 
these types of reports in personal meetings with key executive peers. It is seldom 
advisable to broadcast complex and nuanced metrics-based reports to large groups, 
unless the key points are well established and embedded in a more complete context 
such as a newsletter or press release. 
2.5 Risk Management: Identifying and Assessing Risk  
Information security departments exist primarily to manage information technology 
(IT) risk. Managing risk is one of the key responsibilities of every manager within 
the organization. In any well-developed risk management program, two formal 
processes are at work (Lu et al., 2009): 
- The first, risk identification and assessment. 
- The second, risk control 
Each manager in the organization, regardless of his or her affiliation with one of the 
three communities of interest, should focus on reducing risk as follows: 
- General management must structure the IT and information security functions 
in ways that will result in the successful defense of the organization's 
information assets, including data, hardware, software, procedures, and 
people. 
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- IT management must serve the information technology needs of the broader 
organization and at the same time exploit the special skills and insights of the 
information security community. 
- Information security management must lead the way with skill, professional-
ism, and flexibility as it works with the other communities of interest to bal-
ance the constant trade-offs between information system utility and security. 
2.5.1 Risk Management 
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred 
battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will 
also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in 
every battle. 
Chinese general Sun Tzu's observation, made more than 2400 years ago, continues to 
have direct relevance to the philosophy of information security today. Information 
security strategy and tactics are in many ways similar to those employed in 
conventional warfare. Information security managers and technicians are the 
defenders of information. A myriad of threats constantly attacks the organization's 
information assets. A layered defense is the foundation of any information security 
program. So, as Sun Tzu recommends, reducing risk an organization must know 
itself and know its enemy. This means that managers from all three communities of 
interest must locate the weaknesses of their organization's operations; understand 
how the organization's information is processed, stored, and transmitted; and identify 
what resources are available. Only then can any strategic plan of defense be 
developed (Ryan and Ryan, 2005). 
2.5.1.1 Knowing Ourselves 
When operating any kind of organization, a certain amount of risk is always 
involved. Risk is inherent in hiring, marketing products, and even in making 
decisions about where to place the building that houses the organization. Risk winds 
its way into the dairy operations of every organization, and if it is not properly 
managed, can cause operational failures and even lead to complete collapse. 
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For an organization to manage risk properly, managers should understand how infor-
mation is processed, stored, and transmitted. Armed with this knowledge, they can 
then initiate an in-depth risk management program. Note that the mere existence of a 
risk management program is not sufficient. Frequently, risk management 
mechanisms are implemented but not maintained and kept current. Risk management 
is a process, which means the safeguards and controls that are devised and 
implemented, are not install-and-forget devices (Johnson, 2009). 
2.5.1.2 Knowing the Enemy 
Once an organization becomes aware of its weaknesses, managers can then take up 
Sun Tzu's second dictum: Know the enemy. This means identifying, examining, and 
understanding the threats facing the organization's information assets. Managers 
must be prepared fully to identify those threats that pose risks to the organization and 
the security of its information assets. Risk management is the process of discovering 
and assessing the risks to an organization's operations and determining how those 
risks can be controlled or mitigated. Risk analysis is the identification and 
assessment of levels of risk in the organization (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
2.5.1.3 Accountability for Risk Management 
All three communities of interest bear responsibility for the management of risks, 
and each has a particular strategic role to play. 
- Information security: Because members of the information security commu-
nity best understand the threats and attacks that introduce risk, they often take 
a leadership role in addressing risk. 
- Information technology: This group must help to build secure systems and 
ensure their safe operation.  
- Management and users: When properly trained and kept aware of the threats 
faced by the organization, this group plays a part in the early detection and 
response process. Members of this community also ensure that sufficient 
resources (money and personnel) are allocated to the information security and 
information technology groups to meet the security needs of the organization.  
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All three communities of interest must work together to address every level of risk, 
ranging from full-scale disasters (whether natural or human-made) to the smallest 
mistake made by an employee (Whitman and Mattord, 2007).  
2.5.2 Risk Identification 
Risk identification begins with the process of self-examination. At this stage, 
managers identify the organization's information assets, classify them into useful 
groups, and prioritize them by their overall importance. This can be a daunting task, 
but it must be done to identify weaknesses and the threats they present. 
2.5.2.1 Creating an Inventory of Information Assets 
The risk identification process begins with the identification of information assets, 
including people, procedures, data, software, hardware, and networking elements. 
This step should be done without prejudging the value of each asset; values will be 
assigned later in the process.  
Below are the standard IT system components (people, procedures, data, software, 
hardware, and networks) alongside a risk management breakdown of those 
components. More specifically: 
- People are divided into insiders (employees) and outsiders (nonemployees). 
Insiders come in two categories: either they hold trusted roles and have corre-
spondingly greater authority and accountability, or they are regular staff with-
out any special privileges. The group of outsiders consists of other users who 
have access to the organization's information assets. 
- Procedures are assets since they are used to create value for the organization. 
They are split into two categories: IT and business standard procedures, and 
IT and business sensitive procedures. Sensitive procedures have the potential 
to enable an attack or to otherwise introduce risk to the organization.  
- Data components account for information in all states: transmission, process-
ing, and storage. These categories expand the conventional use of the term 
"data," which is usually associated with databases, not the full range of infor-
mation used by modern organizations. 
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- Software elements can be inventoried in one of three categories: applications, 
operating systems, or security components. Software components that 
provide security controls may fall into the operating systems or applications 
category, but are differentiated by the fact that they7 are part of the infor-
mation security control environment and must be protected more thoroughly 
than other systems components. 
- Hardware is split into two categories: the usual systems devices and their 
peripherals, and the devices that are part of information security control 
systems. The latter must be protected more thoroughly than the former. 
- Networking components are extracted from software and hardware because 
networking subsystems are often the focal point of attacks against a system. 
Of course, most computer systems today include networking elements. It has 
to be determined whether a device is primarily a computer or primarily a 
networking device. A server computer that is used exclusively as a proxy 
server or bastion host may be classified as a networking component, while an 
identical server configured as a database server may be classified as 
hardware. For this reason, they should be considered separately, rather than 
combined with general hardware and software components. 
2.5.2.2 Classifying and Categorizing Assets 
Once the initial inventory is assembled, it must be determined that whether its asset 
categories are meaningful to the organization's risk management program. Such a 
review may cause managers to further subdivide the categories or to create new 
categories that had better meet the needs of the risk management program.  
The inventory should also reflect the sensitivity and security priority assigned to each 
information asset. A classification scheme should be developed (or reviewed, if 
already in place) that categorizes these information assets based on their sensitivity 
and security needs. Consider the following classification scheme for an information 
asset: confidential, internal, and public. Each of these classification categories 
designates the level of protection needed for a particular information asset. Some 
asset types, such as personnel, may require an alternative classification scheme that 
would identify the information security processes used by the asset type. 
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Classification categories must be comprehensive and mutually exclusive. 
Comprehensive means that all inventoried assets fit into a category; mutually 
exclusive means that each asset is found in only one category (Whitman and Mattord, 
2007).  
2.5.2.3 Assessing Values for Information Assets 
As each information asset is identified, categorized, and classified, a relative value 
must also be assigned to it. Relative values are comparative judgments intended to 
ensure that the most valuable information assets are given the highest priority when 
managing risk. It may be impossible to know in advance—in absolute economic 
terms—what losses will be incurred if an asset is compromised; however, a relative 
assessment helps to ensure that the higher-value assets are protected first. 
As each information asset is assigned to its proper category, posing the following 
basic questions can help you develop the weighting criteria to be used for 
information asset valuation or impact evaluation.  
- Which information asset is the most critical to the success of the 
organization? When determining the relative importance of each information 
asset, refer to the organization's mission statement or statement of objectives. 
From this source, determine which assets are essential for meeting the 
organization's objectives, which assets support the objectives, and which are 
merely adjuncts.  
- Which information asset generates the most revenue? The relative value of an 
information asset depends on how much revenue it generates—or, in the case 
of a nonprofit organization, how critical it is to service delivery. Some 
organizations have different systems in place for each line of business or ser-
vice they offer. Which of these assets plays the biggest role in generating rev-
enue or delivering services? 
- Which information asset generates the highest profitability? Managers should 
evaluate how much profit depends on a particular asset. For instance, at 
Amazon, com, some servers support the book sales operations, others support 
the auction process, and still others support the customer book review 
database. Which of these servers contributes the most to the profitability of 
the business? Although important, the review database server does not 
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directly generate profits. Note the distinction between revenues and profits: 
Some systems on which revenues depend operate on thin or nonexistent 
margins and do not generate profits. In nonprofit organizations, you can 
determine what percentage of the agency's clientele receives services from 
the information asset being evaluated. 
- Which information asset is the most expensive to replace? Sometimes an 
information asset acquires special value because it is unique. If an enterprise 
still uses a Model-129 keypunch machine to create special punch-card entries 
for a critical batch run, for example, that machine may be worth more than its 
cost, because spare parts or service providers may no longer be available. 
Another example is a specialty device with a long delivery time frame 
because of manufacturing or transportation requirements. Organizations must 
control the risk of loss or damage to such unique assets—for example, by 
buying and storing a backup device. 
- Which information asset is the most expensive to protect? Some assets are by 
their nature difficult to protect, and formulating a complete answer to this 
question may not be possible until after the risk identification phase is com-
plete, because the costs of controls cannot be computed until the controls are 
identified. However, you can still make a preliminary assessment of the rela-
tive difficulty of establishing controls for each asset. 
- Which information asset's loss or compromise would be the most 
embarrassing or cause the greatest liability? Almost even' organization is 
aware of its image in the local, national, and international spheres. Loss or 
exposure of some assets would prove especially embarrassing. 
2.5.2.4 Listing Assets in Order of Importance 
The final step in the risk identification process is to list the assets in order of 
importance. This goal can be achieved by using a weighted factor analysis 
worksheet. In this process, each information asset is assigned a score for each critical 
factor (Whitman and Mattord, 2007).  
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2.5.2.5 Data Classification Model 
A simple scheme can allow an organization to protect its sensitive information such 
as marketing or research data, personnel data, customer data, and general internal 
communications. A scheme such as the following could be adopted: 
- Public: For general public dissemination, such as an advertisement or press 
release. 
- For official use only: Not for public release but not particularly sensitive, 
such as internal communications. 
- Sensitive: Important information that could embarrass the organization or 
cause loss of market share if compromised. 
- Classified: Essential and confidential information, disclosure of which could 
severely damage the well-being of the organization. 
2.5.2.6 Security Clearances 
Another perspective on the data classification scheme is the personnel security 
clearance structure, in which each user of an information asset is assigned an 
authorization level that indicates the level of information classification he or she can 
access. This is usually accomplished by assigning each employee to a named role, 
such as data entry clerk, development programmer, information security analyst, or 
even CIO. Most organizations have developed a set of roles and corresponding 
security clearances, so that individuals are assigned authorization levels that correlate 
with the classifications of the information assets. 
Beyond a simple reliance on the security, clearance of the individual is the need-to-
know principle. Regardless of one's security clearance, an individual is not allowed 
to view data simply because it falls within that individual's level of clearance. That 
is, after being granted a security clearance but before viewing a specific set of data, a 
person must also meet the need-to-know requirement. This extra requirement ensures 
that the confidentiality of information is properly maintained (Whitman and Mattord, 
2007). 
 46 
2.5.2.7 Management of the Classified Information Asset 
Managing an information asset includes all aspects of its life cycle—from 
specification, design, acquisition, implementation, use, storage, distribution, backup, 
recovery, retirement, to destruction. An information asset, such as a report, that has a 
classification designation other than unclassified or public must be clearly marked as 
such.  
Classified documents must be available only to authorized individuals, which usually 
require locking file cabinets, safes, or other such protective devices for hard copies 
and systems. When an individual carries a classified report, it should be 
inconspicuous and kept in a locked briefcase or portfolio, and in compliance with 
appropriate policies (for example, requirements for double-sealed envelopes, tamper-
proof seals, etc.). 
To maintain the confidentiality of classified documents, managers can implement a 
risk management policy control known as the clean desk policy. This policy usually 
meets with resistance because it requires each employee to secure all information in 
its appropriate storage container at the end of every business day. 
When copies of classified information are no longer valuable or too many copies 
exist, care should be taken to destroy them properly, usually after double signature 
verification. Documents should be destroyed by means of shredding, burning, or 
transfer to a service offering authorized document destruction. Policy should ensure 
that no classified information is inappropriately disposed of in trash or recycling 
areas. Otherwise, people who engage in dumpster diving may retrieve information 
and thereby compromise the security of the organization's information assets 
(Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
2.5.2.8 Threat Identification 
The ultimate goal of risk identification is to assess the circumstances and setting of 
each information asset to reveal any vulnerabilities. Armed with a properly classified 
inventory, you can assess potential weaknesses in each information asset—a process 
known as threat identification. 
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Any organization typically faces a wide variety of threats. If you assume that every 
threat can and will attack every information asset, then the project scope becomes too 
complex. To make the process less unwieldy, each step in the threat identification 
and vulnerability identification processes is managed separately and then coordinated 
at the end. At every step the manager is called on to exercise good judgment and 
draw on experience to make the process function smoothly (Whitman and Mattord, 
2007). 
Identify and Prioritize Threats and Threat Agents: 
Each of threats to information security presents a unique challenge to information 
security and must be handled with specific controls that directly address the 
particular threat and the threat agent's attack strategy. Before threats can be assessed 
in the risk identification process, however, each threat must be further examined to 
determine its potential to affect the targeted information asset. In general, this 
process is referred to as threat assessment.  
Both quantitative and qualitative measures can be used to rank values. Since 
information is preliminary, the organization may want to rank threats subjectively in 
order of danger. Alternatively, it may simply rate each of the threats on a scale of 1 
to 5, with 1 designating insignificant threats and 5 designating highly significant 
threats. 
2.5.2.9 Frequency of Attacks 
Remarkably, detected attacks are decreasing. After a peak in 2000, the number of 
organizations reporting unauthorized use of computer systems has been declining 
steadily, while the amount reporting no unauthorized access has been increasing. 
Unfortunately, the number of organizations reporting that they just do not know is 
holding steady. The fact is, almost every company has experienced an attack. 
Whether that attack was successful depends on the company's security efforts; 
whether the perpetrators were caught or the organization was willing to report the 
attack is another matter entirely (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
- How much would it cost to recover from a successful attack? One of the cal-
culations that guides corporate spending on controls is the cost of recovery 
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operations if an attack occurs and is successful. At this preliminary phase, it 
is not necessary to conduct a detailed assessment of the costs associated with 
recovering from a particular attack. Instead, organizations often create 
subjective ranking or listing of the threats based on recovery cost. 
Alternatively, you could assign a rating for each threat on a scale of 1 to 5, 
with 1 representing "not expensive at all" and 5 representing "extremely 
expensive."  
- Which threats would require the greatest expenditure to prevent? Another 
factor that affects the danger posed by a particular threat is the amount it 
would cost to protect against that threat. Controlling some threats has a 
nominal cost, as in protections from malicious code, while other protective 
strategies are very expensive, as in protections from forces of nature.  
This list of questions may not cover everything that affects risk identification. An 
organization's specific guidelines or policies should influence the process and will 
inevitably require that some additional questions be answered. 
Vulnerability Assessment: 
Once you have identified the information assets of the organization and documented 
some threat assessment criteria, you can begin to review every information asset for 
each threat. This review leads to the creation of a list of vulnerabilities that remain 
potential risks to the organization. What are vulnerabilities? They are specific 
avenues that threat agents can exploit to attack an information asset. In other words, 
they are chinks in the asset's armor—a flaw or weakness in an information asset, 
security procedure, design, or control that can be exploited accidentally or on 
purpose to breach security.  
2.5.2.10 The TVA Worksheet 
At the end of the risk identification process, an organization should have a prioritized 
list of assets and their vulnerabilities. This list serves as the starting point (with its 
supporting documentation from the identification process) for the next step in the 
risk management process—risk assessment. Another list prioritizes threats facing the 
organization based on the weighted table discussed earlier. These two lists can be 
combined into a Threats-Vulnerabilities-Assets (TVA) worksheet, in preparation for 
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the addition of vulnerability and control information during risk assessment. Along 
one axis lies the prioritized set of assets. The prioritized list of threats is placed along 
the vertical axis, with the most important or most dangerous threat listed at the top. 
The resulting grid provides a convenient method of examining the "exposure" of 
assets, allowing a simplistic vulnerability assessment.  
In the risk assessment phase, not only are the vulnerabilities examined, but the 
assessment team also analyzes any existing controls that protect the asset from the 
threat, or mitigates the losses that may occur (Whitman and Mattord, 2007).  
2.5.3 Risk Assessment 
Assessing the relative risk for each vulnerability is accomplished via a process called 
risk assessment. Risk assessment assigns a risk rating or score to each specific 
vulnerability. While this number does not mean anything in absolute terms, it enables 
you to gauge the relative risk associated with each vulnerable information asset, and 
it facilitates the creation of comparative ratings later in the risk control process. 
2.5.3.1 Introduction to Risk Assessment 
The goal at this point is to create a method to evaluate the relative risk of each listed 
vulnerability.  
2.5.3.2 Likelihood 
Likelihood is the overall rating—a numerical value on a defined scale—of the 
probability that a specific vulnerability will be exploited. In Special Publication 800-
30, NIST recommends that vulnerabilities be assigned a likelihood rating between 
0.1 (low) and 1.0 (high). For example, the likelihood of an employee or system being 
struck by a meteorite while indoors would be rated 0.1, while the likelihood of 
receiving at least one e-mail containing a virus or worm in the next year would be 
rated 1.0. You could also choose to use a number between 1 and 100, but not 0, since 
vulnerabilities with a 0 likelihood should have already been removed from the 
asset/vulnerability list. Whatever rating system you employ for assigning likelihood, 
use professionalism, experience, and judgment to determine the rating—and use it 
consistently. Whenever possible, use external references for likelihood values, after 
reviewing and adjusting them for your specific circumstances. For many 
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asset/vulnerability combinations, existing sources have already determined their 
likelihood. For example, 
- The likelihood of a fire has been estimated actuarially for each type of 
structure. 
- The likelihood that any given e-mail will contain a virus or worm has been 
researched. 
- The number of network attacks can be forecast depending on how many net-
work addresses the organization has assigned. 
2.5.3.3 Assessing Potential Loss 
Using the information documented during the risk identification process, you can 
assign weighted scores based on the value of each information asset. The actual 
number used will vary according to the needs of the organization. Some groups use a 
scale of 1 to 100, with 100 being reserved for those information assets whose loss 
would stop company operations within a few minutes. Other recommended scales, 
including the one in NIST SP 800-30, use assigned weights in broad categories, with 
all-important assets having a value of 100, low-criticality assets having a value of 1, 
and all other assets having a medium value of 50. Still other scales employ weights 
from 1 to 10, or assigned values of 1, 3, and 5 to represent low-, medium-, and high-
valued assets, respectively. Alternatively, you can create unique weight values 
customized to your organization's specific needs. 
To be effective, the values must be assigned by asking the questions listed earlier in 
the section entitled "Identify and Prioritize Threats and Threat Agents." These 
questions are restated here for easy reference. 
- Which threats present a danger to this organization's assets in its current 
environment? 
- Which threats represent the gravest danger to the organization's information 
assets? 
- How much would it cost to recover from a successful attack? 
- Which threats would require the greatest expenditure to prevent? 
After reconsidering these questions, use the background information from the risk 
identification process and add to that information by posing yet another question: 
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- Which of the aforementioned questions is the most important to the protec-
tion of information from threats within this organization? 
The answer to this question determines the priorities used in the assessment of 
vulnerabilities. Which is the most important to the organization—the cost to recover 
from a threat attack or the cost to protect against a threat attack? More generally, 
which of the threats has the highest probability of successful attack? Recall that the 
purpose of risk assessment is to look at the threats an organization faces in its current 
state. Once these questions are answered, move to the next step in the process: 
examining how current controls can reduce the risk faced by specific vulnerabilities. 
2.5.3.4 Percentage of Risk Mitigated by Current Controls 
If a vulnerability is fully managed by an existing control, it can be set aside. If it is 
partially controlled, estimate what percentage of the vulnerability has been 
controlled. 
2.5.3.5 Uncertainty 
It is not possible to know everything about every vulnerability, such as how likely is 
an attack against an asset, or how great of an impact would a successful attack have 
on the organization. The degree to which a current control can reduce risk is also 
subject to estimation error. A factor that accounts for uncertainty must always be 
added to the equations; it consists of an estimate made by the manager using good 
judgment and experience. 
2.5.3.6 Risk Determination 
For the purpose of relative risk assessment, risk equals likelihood of vulnerability 
occurrence times value (or impact) minus percentage risk already controlled plus an 
element of uncertainty (Sumner, 2009).  
2.5.3.7 Identify Possible Controls 
For each threat and its associated vulnerabilities that have residual risk, create a 
preliminary list of control ideas. The purpose of this list, which begins with the 
identification of extant controls, is to identify areas of residual risk that neither may 
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nor may not need to be reduced. Residual risk is the risk that remains even after the 
existing control has been applied. Controls, safeguards, and countermeasures are all 
terms used to describe security mechanisms, policies, and procedures. These 
mechanisms, policies, and procedures counter attacks, reduce risk, resolve 
vulnerabilities, and otherwise improve the general state of security within an 
organization. 
Three general categories of controls exist: policies, programs, and technical controls. 
Programs are activities performed within the organization to improve security; they 
include security education, training, and awareness programs. Technical controls—
also known as security technologies—are the technical implementations of the 
policies defined by the organization. These controls, whether in place or planned, 
should be added to the TVA worksheet as they are identified (Wiant, 2005). 
2.5.3.8 Access Controls 
Access controls specifically address the admission of users into a trusted area of the 
organization. These areas can include information systems, physically restricted 
areas such as computer rooms, and even the organization in its entirety. Access 
controls usually consist of a combination of policies, programs, and technologies. 
A number of approaches to, and categories of, access controls exist. They can be 
mandatory, nondiscretionary, or discretionary. Each category of controls regulates 
access to a particular type or collection of information, as explained below (Whitman 
and Mattord, 2007). 
Mandatory Access Controls (MACs): 
MACs are required—obviously—and are structured and coordinated with a data 
classification scheme. When MACs are implemented, users and data owners have 
limited control over their access to information resources. MACs use a data 
classification scheme that rates each collection of information. Each user is also rated 
to specify the level of information that he or she may access. These ratings are often 
referred to as sensitivity levels. 
In a variation of this form of access control called lattice-based access control, users 
are assigned a matrix of authorizations for particular areas of access. The level of 
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authorization may vary depending on the classification authorizations that 
individuals possess for each group of information assets or resources. The lattice 
structure contains subjects and objects, and the boundaries associated with each 
subject/object pair are clearly demarcated. Lattice-based access control then specifies 
the level of access each subject has to each object, if any. With this type of control, 
the column of attributes associated with a particular object (such as a printer) is 
referred to as an access control list (ACL). The row of attributes associated with a 
particular subject (such as a user) is referred to as a capabilities table. 
Nondiscretionary Controls: 
Nondiscretionary controls are determined by a central authority in the organization 
and can be based on roles—called role-based controls—or on a specified set of 
tasks—called task-based controls. Task-based controls can, in turn, be based on lists 
maintained on subjects or objects. Role-based controls are tied to the role that a 
particular user performs in an organization, whereas task-based controls are tied to a 
particular assignment or responsibility. 
The role- and task-based controls make it easier to maintain controls and restrictions, 
especially if the individual performing the role or task changes often. Instead of con-
stantly assigning and revoking the privileges of individuals who come and go, the 
administrator simply assigns the associated access rights to the role or task. Mien 
individuals are subsequently assigned to that role or task, they automatically receive 
the corresponding access. The administrator can easily remove individuals' 
associations with roles and tasks, thereby revoking their access. 
Discretionary Access Controls (DACs): 
DACs are implemented at the discretion or option of the data user. The ability to 
share resources in a peer-to-peer configuration allows users to control and possibly 
provide access to information or resources at their disposal. The users can allow 
general, unrestricted access, or they can allow specific individuals or sets of 
individuals to access these resources. As an example, suppose a user has a hard drive 
containing information to be shared with office coworkers. This user can elect to 
allow access to specific individuals by listing their names in the share control 
function. 
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2.6 Risk Management: Controlling Risk 
In the early days of information technology, corporations used information 
technology (IT) systems mainly to gain advantages over their competition. Managers 
discovered that establishing a competitive business model, method, or technique 
allowed an organization to provide a product or service that was superior in some 
decisive way, thus creating a competitive advantage. But this is no longer true. The 
current IT industry has evolved from this earlier model to one in which almost all 
competitors operate at a similar level of automation. Because IT is now readily 
available to almost all organizations willing to make the investment, they can all 
react quickly to changes in the market. In today's highly competitive environment, 
managers realize that investing in IT systems at a level that merely maintains the 
status quo is no longer sufficient to gain a competitive advantage. In fact, even the 
implementation of new technologies does not necessarily enable an organization to 
maintain a competitive lead. Instead, the concept of competitive disadvantages—the 
state of falling behind the competition—has emerged as a critical factor. Effective 
IT-enabled organizations now quickly absorb emerging technologies, not to gain or 
maintain the traditional competitive advantage, but rather to avoid the possibility of 
losing market share when faltering systems make it impossible to maintain the 
current standard of service (Bojanc and Jerman-Blazic, 2008). 
To keep up with the competition, organizations must design and create a safe 
environment in which business processes and procedures can function effectively. 
This environment must maintain confidentiality and privacy and assure the integrity 
and availability of organizational data. These objectives are met via the application 
of the principles of risk management. 
Risk management is the process used by managers, auditors, and other professionals 
to identify vulnerabilities in an organization's information systems and to assure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all the components in the organization's 
information systems. When an organization depends on IT systems to remain viable, 
information security and the discipline of risk management move beyond theoretical 
discussions to become an integral part of the economic basis for making business 
decisions. These decisions are based on trade-offs between the costs of applying 
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information systems controls and the benefits realized from the operation of secured, 
available systems. 
Controlling risk begins with an understanding of what risk mitigation strategies are 
and how to formulate them (Whitman and Mattord, 2007).  
2.6.1 Risk Control Strategies 
When an organization's general management team determines that risks from 
information security threats are creating a competitive disadvantage, it empowers the 
information technology and information security communities of interest to control 
those risks. Once the project team for information security development has created 
the ranked vulnerability worksheet, the team must choose one of four basic strategies 
to control the risks that arise from these vulnerabilities (Bodin et al., 2008): 
- Avoidance: Applying safeguards that eliminate or reduce the remaining 
uncontrolled risks 
- Transference: Shifting the risks to other areas or to outside entities 
- Mitigation: Reducing the impact should an attacker successfully exploit the 
vulnerability 
- Acceptance: Understanding the consequences and acknowledging the risk 
without any attempts at control or mitigation 
2.6.2 Managing Risk 
Risk appetite (also known as risk tolerance) describes the quantity and nature of risk 
that organizations are willing to accept, as they evaluate the trade-offs between 
perfect security and unlimited accessibility. For instance, a financial services 
company, regulated by government and conservative by nature, seeks to apply every 
reasonable control and even some invasive controls to protect its information assets. 
Other, less closely regulated organizations may also be conservative, and thus seek to 
avoid the negative publicity and perceived loss of integrity caused by the exploitation 
of a vulnerability. A firewall vendor might install a set of firewall rules that are far 
more stringent than necessary, simply because being hacked would jeopardize its 
market. Other organizations may take on dangerous risks because of ignorance. The 
reasoned approach to risk is one that balances the expense (in terms of finance and 
 56 
the usability of information assets) against the possible losses if exploited (Siponen, 
2009). 
The key is for the organization to find balance in its decision-making processes and 
in its feasibility analyses, thereby assuring that its risk appetite is based on 
experience and facts, and not on ignorance or wishful thinking. 
When vulnerabilities have been controlled as much as possible, there is often remain-
ing risk that has not been completely removed, shifted, or planned for—in other 
words, residual risk. Expressed another way, "Residual risk is a combined function 
of (1) a threat less the effect of threat-reducing safeguards; (2) a vulnerability less the 
effect of vulnerability-reducing safeguards; and (3) an asset less the effect of asset 
value-reducing safeguards." 
Although it might seem counterintuitive, the goal of information security is not to 
bring residual risk to zero; rather, it is to bring residual risk in line with an 
organization's risk appetite. If decision makers have been informed of uncontrolled 
risks and the proper authority groups within the communities of interest decide to 
leave residual risk in place, then the information security program has accomplished 
its primary goal (Brenner, 2007). 
After the information system is designed, you must determine whether the system 
has vulnerabilities that can be exploited. If a viable threat exists, examine what an 
attacker would gain from a successful attack. Then, estimate the expected loss the 
organization will incur if the vulnerability is successfully exploited. If this loss is 
within the range of losses the organization can absorb, or if the attacker's gain is less 
than the likely cost of executing the attack, the organization may choose to accept the 
risk.  
Once a control strategy has been selected and implemented, controls should be moni-
tored and measured on an ongoing basis to determine their effectiveness and to 
estimate the remaining risk.  
At a minimum, each information asset-threat pair should have a documented control 
strategy that clearly identifies any residual risk that remains after the proposed 
strategy has been executed. This control strategy articulates which of the four 
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fundamental risk-reducing approaches will be used, how the various approaches 
might be combined, and justifies the findings by referencing the feasibility studies. 
Some organizations document the outcome of the control strategy for each informa-
tion asset-threat pair in an action plan. This action plan includes concrete tasks with 
accountability for each task being assigned to an organizational unit or to an 
individual. It may include hardware and software requirements, budget estimates, 
and detailed timelines (Whitman and Mattord, 2007). 
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3. INFORMATION SECURITY PROJECTS MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Information Security Project Management 
The need for project management skills within the practice of information security 
may not at first be self-evident. The information security is a process, not a project. 
However, each element of an information security program must be managed as a 
project, even if it is an ongoing one. Organizations routinely require technically 
skilled IT or information security experts to lead projects, or they assign experienced 
project and general managers to lead information security projects. Some 
organizations use both approaches simultaneously, sometimes assigning project 
management tasks to technical managers and sometimes assigning those tasks to a 
general manager, so that all elements of the information security program are 
completed with quality deliverables, on a timely basis, and within budget (Ma et al., 
2008). 
How can information security be both a process and a project? It is, in fact, a 
continuous series, or chain, of projects. Each link in this chain could be a specific 
project, and each of these projects would be guided by the security systems 
development life cycle (SecSDLC). 
To be sure, some aspects of information security are not project based; rather, they 
are managed processes. These managed processes include the monitoring of the 
external and internal environments during incident response, ongoing risk 
assessments of routine operations, and continuous vulnerability assessment and 
vulnerability repair. These activities are called operations and are ongoing. 
Projects, on the other hand, are discrete sequences of activities with starting points 
and defined completion points. In other words, a "project is a temporary endeavor 
undertaken to create a unique product or service." Although each individual 
information security project has an end point, larger organizations never completely 
finish the information security improvement process; they periodically review 
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progress and realign planning to meet business and IT objectives. This realignment 
can lead to new goals and projects, as well as the modification, cancellation, or 
reprioritization of existing projects (Rose, 2004).  
3.1.1 Project Management 
Project management is the application of knowledge, skills, tools and techniques to 
project activities to meet project requirements. Project management is accomplished 
with processes such as initiating, planning, executing, controlling and closing. 
In other words, project management is focused on achieving the objectives of the 
project. Unlike ongoing operations, project management involves the temporary 
assemblage of a group that completes the project, and whose members are then 
released, and perhaps assigned to the other projects. Projects are sometimes seen as 
development opportunities that enable employees and managers to extend their skills 
in readiness for promotion to larger opportunities. This can lead to one of the 
common pitfalls in organizations that have operations groups and project teams: the 
prima donna effect, where certain groups are perceived as elite or more skilled than 
others (Sipior and Ward, 2008).  
Although project management is focused on projects that have ends, this does not 
mean these projects are one-time occurrences. Some projects are iterative, and occur 
regularly. Budgeting processes, for example, are iterative projects. Each year the 
budget committee meets, designs a proposed budget for the following year, and then 
presents it to the appropriate manager. The committee may not meet again for six to 
nine months until the next budget cycle. Another common practice is the creation of 
a sequence of projects, with periodic submission of grouped deliverables. Each 
project phase has a defined set of objectives and deliverables, and the authorization 
to progress to future phases is tied to the success of the preceding phase as well as 
availability of funding or other critical resources. 
Some organizational cultures have a long record of relying on project management 
and have put in place training programs and reward structures to develop a cadre of 
highly skilled project managers and a corresponding group of trained technical 
personnel. Other organizations implement each project from scratch, and define the 
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process as they go. Organizations that make project management skills a priority 
accrue many benefits, including (Reddick, 2009):  
- Implementation of a methodology ensures that no steps are missed. 
- Creation of a detailed blueprint of project activities serves as a common 
reference tool, and makes all project team members more productive by 
shortening the learning curve when getting projects underway. 
- Identification of specific responsibilities for all involved personnel lessens 
ambiguity and reduces confusion when individuals are assigned to new or dif-
ferent projects. 
- Clear definition of project constraints, including time frame, budget, and 
minimum-quality requirements increases the likelihood that the project stays 
within them. 
- Establishing measures of performance and creation of project milestones 
simplifies project monitoring. 
- Early identification of deviations in quality, time, or budget enables early 
correction. 
Successful project management relies on careful and realistic project planning 
coupled with aggressive proactive control. The project success may be defined 
differently in each organization, but in general a project is deemed a success when: 
- It is completed on time or early. 
- It comes in at or below the expenditures planned for in the baseline budget 
- It meets all specifications outlined in the approved project definition, and the 
deliverables are accepted by the end user and/or assigning entity. 
3.1.2 Applying Project Management To Security 
To apply project management to information security, you must first select an 
established project management methodology. Just as information security systems 
analysts use the SecSDLC, information security project managers often follow 
methodologies based on the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBoK), a 
methodology promoted by the Project Management Institute. While other project 
management approaches exist, the PMBoK is considered the industry best practice 
(Siponen and Willison, 2009).  
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4. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The survey is conducted among 80 organizations from 8 business industries in 
Turkey in order to carry out a review of the organizations’ information security 
maturity levels and evaluated their ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard compliance.  
The 72 information security related questions in the survey, derived from 133 
security measures in ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard, cover information security 
measures that should be implemented by organizations, including organizational, 
physical and technical controls. 
The survey is conducted among 80 organizations. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 
demonstrate number of participants at each business industry and industry division of 
80 organizations.  
Table 4.1 : Benchmark group profile 
No         Business Industry Number of                 Number of  
Organization              Organisation (%) 
1            Financial/Insurance 14                               17,50% 
2            Telecommunications 8                                 10,00% 
3            Manufacturing/Engineering 13                               16,25% 
4            Retail/Wholesale/Distribution 9                                 11,25% 
5            Real Estate 
6            Healthcare/Medical 
7            Electric, Gas and Heat Supply         
              Service 
8            Information Service 
7                                 8,75% 
9                                 11,25% 
8                                 10,00% 
 
12                               15,00% 
The highest participant organizations at the survey belong to Financial/Insurance 
(17,50%), Manufacturing/Engineering (16,25%) and Information Service (15,00%) 
industries respectively.  
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Figure 4.1 : Industry breakdown 
In the survey, for each answer, the participants selected the most appropriate level 
from the five levels as demonstrated in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 : Answers on a one-to-five scale 
Level Answers on a one-to-five scale that reflect the degree of maturity 
1 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 5 
The management is not aware of its necessity or no rule and control has been 
established even though they are aware of its necessity. 
 
The management is aware of its necessity and they are proceeding to 
formulate and disseminate the rules and controls, but only some part of 
them is implemented. 
 
The rules and controls have been established with the approval of the 
management, and they are disseminated and implemented company-
wide, but the state of implementation has not been reviewed. 
 
The rules and controls have been established under the leadership and 
approval of the management, and they are disseminated and implemented 
company-wide with its status reviewed on a regular basis by the 
responsible person. 
 
In addition to those described in item 4 above, your company has improved 
it to become a good example for other companies by dynamically 
reflecting the changes of security environment. 
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Information Security Policy
Information Security Organization
Asset Management 
Human Resources Security
Physical and Environmental Security
Communications and Operations 
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Access Control 
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Compliance 
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Average score
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 The “radar” graph is used 
security maturity level and evaluate ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard compliance as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 : 
For Telecommunications industry, t
compared as demonstrated in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.4.
The top three differences between average scores and desired levels are seen at 
“Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance”
“Business Continuity Management”
Organization” (29,31%) controls respectively.
Table 4.4 : Average scores and desired levels for Telecommunications industry
Controls         
Information Security Policy 
Information Security Organization
Asset Management 
Human Resources Security 
Physical and Environmental Security
Communications and Operations 
Management 
Access Control 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance 
Information Security Incident Management
Business Continuity Management
Compliance 
Access Control
Information Systems 
Acquisition, …
Information Security 
Incident Management
Business Continuity 
Management
Compliance
Score for Financial/Insurance Industry
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to assess Financial/Insurance industry’s information 
Score for Financial/Insurance industry 
he average scores and desired levels are 
  
 
 (29,86%) and “Information Security 
 
Average score    Desired level    Difference              
2,90                    4,00                   27,50%
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2,92                    3,94                   26,02%
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 Figure 4.4 : Average scores and desired levels for Telecommunications industry
The “radar” graph is used to assess 
security maturity level and evaluate ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard compliance as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5 : 
For Manufacturing/Engineering 
compared as demonstrated in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.6. 
The top three differences between average scores and desired levels are seen at 
“Information Security Policy”
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Average score
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 Development and Maintenance”
(26,90%) controls respectively.
Table 4.5 : Average scores and desired levels for Manufacturing/Engineering 
Controls         
Information Security Policy 
Information Security Organization
Asset Management 
Human Resources Security 
Physical and Environmental Security
Communications and Operations 
Management 
Access Control 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance 
Information Security Incident Management
Business Continuity Management
Compliance 
Figure 4.6 : Average scores and desired levels for Manufacturing/Enginee
The “radar” graph is used to assess 
information security maturity level and evaluate ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard 
compliance as demonstrated in Figure 4.7.
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 (27,57%) and “Information Security Organization”
 
industry 
Average score    Desired level    Difference
2,87                    3,97                   27,71%
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 Figure 4.7 : 
For Retail/Wholesale/Distribution industry, t
compared as demonstrated in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.8. 
The top three differences between average scores and desired levels are seen at 
“Asset Management”
(25,20%) and “Business Continuity Management”
Table 4.6 : Average scores and desired levels for Retail/Wholesale/Distribution 
Controls         
Information Security Policy
Information Security Organization
Asset Management 
Human Resources Security
Physical and Environmental Security
Communications and Operations 
Management 
Access Control 
Information Systems 
Development and Maintenance
Information Security Incident Management
Business Continuity Management
Compliance 
Information Systems 
Acquisition, Development 
and Maintenance
Information Security 
Incident Management
Business Continuity 
Management
69 
Score for Manufacturing/Engineering industry
he average scores and desired levels are 
 
 (26,02%), “Information Security Incident Management”
 (25,16%) controls respectively.
industry 
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 2,90                    3,86                   24,87%
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 Figure 4.8 : Average scores and desired levels for
The “radar” graph is used to assess Retail/Wholesale/Distribution industry’s 
information security maturity level and evaluate ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard 
compliance as demonstrated in Figure 4.9.
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For Real Estate industry, the average scores and desired levels 
demonstrated in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.10
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 Retail/Wholesale/Distribution 
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 “Business Continuity Management
Management” (32,93%) 
Table 4.7 : Average scores and desired levels for Real Estate industry
Controls         
Information Security Policy
Information Security Organization
Asset Management 
Human Resources Security
Physical and Environmental Security
Communications and Operations 
Management 
Access Control 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance
Information Security Incident Management
Business Continuity Management
Compliance 
Figure 4.10 : Average s
The “radar” graph is used to assess Real Estate industry’s information security 
maturity level and evaluate ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard compliance as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.11.
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” (33,33%) and “Information Security Incident 
controls respectively. 
Average score    Desired level  Difference
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 Figure 4.11 : 
For Healthcare/Medical industry, t
as demonstrated in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.12
The top three differences between average scores and desired levels are seen at 
“Information Systems Acquisition, Dev
“Business Continuity Management
Management” (31,96%) controls respectively.
Table 4.8 : Average scores and desired levels for Healthcare/Medical industry
Controls         
Information Security Policy 
Information Security Organization
Asset Management 
Human Resources Security 
Physical and Environmental Security
Communications and Operations 
Management 
Access Control 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance 
Information Security Incident Management
Business Continuity Management
Compliance 
Access Control
Information Systems 
Acquisition, Development 
and Maintenance
Information Security 
Incident Management
Business Continuity 
Management
Compliance
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Score for Real Estate industry 
he average scores and desired levels are compared 
. 
elopment and Maintenance” 
” (32,20%) and “Information Security Incident 
 
Average score    Desired level    Difference
2,34                    3,14                   25,48%
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 Figure 4.12 : Average scores and desired 
The “radar” graph is used to assess Healthcare/Medical industry’s information 
security maturity level and evaluate ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard compliance as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.13
Figure 4.13 : 
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 (29,76%), 
Average score
Desired level
 “Business Continuity Management”
Management” (28,88%) controls respectively.
Table 4.9 : Average scores and desired levels for Electric/Gas/Heat Supply Service 
Controls         
Information Security Policy 
Information Security Organization
Asset Management 
Human Resources Security 
Physical and Environmental Security
Communications and Operations 
Management 
Access Control 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance 
Information Security Incident Management
Business Continuity Management
Compliance 
Figure 4.14 : Average scores and desired levels for Electric/Gas/Heat Supply 
The “radar” graph is used to assess Electric/Gas/Heat Supply Service industry’s 
information security maturity level and evaluate ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard 
compliance as demonstrated in Figure 4.15.
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 (29,50%) and “Information Security Incident 
 
industry 
Average score    Desired level    Difference             
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Figure 4.15 : Score for Electric/Gas/Heat Supply Service industry 
For Information Service industry, the average scores and desired levels are compared 
as demonstrated in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.16. 
The top three differences between average scores and desired levels are seen at 
“Business Continuity Management” (25,75%), “Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance” (22,13%) and “Information Security Incident 
Management” (20,80%) controls respectively. 
Table 4.10 : Average scores and desired levels for Information Service industry 
Controls         Average score    Desired level    Difference              
Information Security Policy 3,42                    4,17                   17,99% 
Information Security Organization 3,35                    4,12                   18,69% 
Asset Management 3,27                    4,06                   19,58% 
Human Resources Security 
Physical and Environmental Security 
3,54                    4,13                   14,14% 
3,40                    4,09                   16,87% 
Communications and Operations 
Management 
Access Control 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance 
Information Security Incident 
Management 
Business Continuity Management 
Compliance 
3,42                    4,06                   15,65% 
 
3,57                    4,09                   12,80% 
2,89                    3,71                   22,13% 
 
3,16                    3,99                   20,80% 
 
2,74                    3,69                   25,75% 
3,48                    3,72                   6,45% 
 Figure 4.16 : Average scores and desired levels for 
The “radar” graph is used to assess Information Service industry’s information 
security maturity level and evaluate ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard compliance as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.17. 
Figure 4.17 : 
Table 4.11 shows average score
clauses) for 8 business industries.
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Table 4.11 : Average scores for each industry 
 
Control 
No 
Financial/ 
Insurance 
Telecomm. Manufacturing/ 
Engineering 
Retail/Wholesale/ 
Distribution 
Real 
Estate 
Healthcare/ 
Medical 
Electric/Gas/ 
Heat Supply 
Service 
Informatio
n Service 
1* 3,16 2,90 2,87 2,90 2,31 2,34 2,98 3,42 
2* 3,39 2,87 2,88 2,93 2,27 2,30 3,15 3,35 
3* 3,00 2,92 2,69 2,63 2,30 2,31 2,84 3,27 
4* 3,21 3,11 2,84 2,95 2,48 2,50 2,80 3,54 
5* 3,12 3,11 2,80 2,87 2,49 2,59 2,81 3,40 
6* 3,22 3,25 3,08 3,19 2,61 2,72 3,10 3,42 
7* 3,49 3,28 3,18 3,30 2,70 2,78 3,00 3,57 
8* 2,71 2,57 2,47 2,70 1,99 2,08 2,62 2,89 
9* 2,98 2,85 2,77 2,81 2,21 2,31 2,85 3,16 
10* 2,62 2,56 2,33 2,41 1,94 2,00 2,39 2,74 
11* 3,20 3,15 3,05 3,10 1,80 1,85 2,70 3,48 
 
1*  : Information Security Policy  
2*  : Information Security Organization 
3*  : Asset Management                
4*  : Human Resources Security 
5*  : Physical and Environmental Security  
6*  : Communications and Operations Management 
7*  : Access Control  
8*  : Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance 
9*  : Information Security Incident Management  
10*: Business Continuity Management 
11*: Compliance 
 Figure 5.1 shows average score
clauses) for 8 business industries
Service”, “Financial/Insurance” and 
scores are “Real Estate” and “Healthcare/Medical”.
Figure 4.18 : 
Figure 5.2 shows the maturity level of each industry for “Information Security 
Policy” which is one of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard clause.
level score is seen at “Information Service”
(3,16/5,00) and “Electric/Gas/Heat
Figure 4.19 : Industry benchmarking for information security policy
Figure 5.3 shows the maturity level of each industry for “Information Security 
Organization” which is one of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard clause. The top three 
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 maturity level score is seen at “Financial/Insurance” (3,39/5,00), “Information 
Service” (3,35/5,00) and “Electric/Ga
Figure 4.20 : Industry benchmarking for information security organization
Figure 5.4 shows the maturity level of each industry for “Asset Management” which 
is one of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard clause. The top three 
seen at “Information Service” (3,
“Telecommunications
Figure 4.21 : 
Figure 5.5 shows the maturity level of each industry for “H
Security” which is one of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard clause. The top three 
maturity level score is seen at “Information Service” (3,54/5,00), 
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s/Heat Supply Service” (3,15/5,00) industries.
maturity level score is 
27/5,00), “Financial/Insurance” (3,00/5,00), 
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 “Financial/Insurance” (3,21/5,00),  and “Telecommunications” (3,11/5,00) 
industries. 
Figure 4.22 : Industry be
Figure 5.6 shows the maturity level of each industry for “Physical and Environmental 
Security” which is one of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard clause. The top three 
maturity level score is seen at “Information Service” 
“Financial/Insurance” (3,12/5,00),  and “Telecommunications” (3,11/5,00) 
industries. 
Figure 4.23 : Industry benchmarking for physical and environmental security
Figure 5.7 shows the maturity level of each industry for “
Operations Management” which is one of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard clause. The 
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 top three maturity level score is seen at “Information Service” (3,4
“Telecommunications” (3,25/5,00) and 
Figure 4.24 : Industry benchmarking for 
Figure 5.8 shows the maturity level of each industry for “
one of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard clause. The top three maturity level score is 
seen at “Information Service” (3,57/5,00), “Financi
“Retail/Wholesale/Distribution” 
Figure 4.25 : 
Figure 5.9 shows the maturity level of each industry for “Information Systems 
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 (2,89/5,00), “Financial/Insurance” (2,71/5,00) and “Retail/Wholesale/Distribution” 
(2,70/5,00) industries. 
Figure 4.26 : Industry benchmarking for informa
development and maintenance
Figure 5.10 shows the maturity level of each industry for “Information Security 
Incident Management” which is one of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard clause. The 
top three maturity level score is seen at “In
“Financial/Insurance” (2,98/5,00) and “Telecommunications” (2,85/5,00) and 
“Electric/Gas/Heat Supply Service” (2,85/5,00) industries.
Figure 4.27 : Industry benchmarking for information security
Figure 5.11 shows the maturity level of each industry for “Business Continuity 
Management” which is one of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard clause. The top three 
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 maturity level score is seen at “Information Service” (2,74/5,00), 
“Financial/Insurance” (2,62/5,00) and “Telecommunicat
Figure 4.28 : Industry benchmarking for business continuity management
Figure 5.12 shows the maturity level of each industry for “Compliance” which is one 
of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard clause. The top three maturity level score is seen at 
“Information Service” (3,48/5,00), “Financial/Insurance” (3,20/5,00) and 
“Telecommunications” (3,1
Figure 4.29 : 
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5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
5.1 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis is to carry out a review of the organizations’ information 
security maturity levels and evaluate their ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard 
compliances.  
Firstly, literature research was performed in order to provide detailed information 
about information security and its need for today’s business life. ISO/IEC 
17799:2005 and ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standards were also mentioned in the literature 
research.  
Afterwards, a survey was conducted among 80 organizations from 8 business 
industries in Turkey. The survey consisted of 72 information security related 
questions derived from 133 security measures in ISO/IEC 17799:2005. The questions 
in the survey covered information security measures that should be implemented by 
organizations, including organizational, physical and technical controls. 
The survey results showed that the rules and controls have been established with the 
approval of the management, and they are at least disseminated and implemented 
company-wide for 11 clauses of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard at Information 
Service, Financial/Insurance and Telecommunications sectors.  
On the other hand, the management is aware of its necessity and they are proceeding 
to formulate and disseminate the rules and controls, but only some part of them is 
implemented for 11 clauses of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard at Real Estate and 
Healthcare/Medical sectors.  
If we assess the survey results for each clause of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard, the 
survey results showed that at 42% of 80 organizations, the rules and controls have 
been established with the approval of the management, and they are at least 
disseminated and implemented company-wide for Clause 5 Information Security 
Policy, Clause 6 Information Security Organization and Clause 9 Physical and 
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Environmental Security of ISO/IEC 17999:2005 standard. On the other hand, at 58% 
of these 80 organizations, the management is aware of its necessity and they are 
proceeding to formulate and disseminate the rules and controls, but only some part of 
them is implemented for Clause 5, Clause 6 and Clause 9 of ISO 17799:2005 
standard. 
At 32% of 80 organizations, the rules and controls have been established with the 
approval of the management, and they are at least disseminated and implemented 
company-wide for Clause 7 Asset Management. On the other hand, at 68% of these 
80 organizations, the management is aware of its necessity and they are proceeding 
to formulate and disseminate the rules and controls, but only some part of them is 
implemented for Clause 7 of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard. 
At 54% of 80 organizations, the rules and controls have been established with the 
approval of the management, and they are at least disseminated and implemented 
company-wide for Clause 8 Human Resources Security. On the other hand, at 46% 
of these 80 organizations, the management is aware of its necessity and they are 
proceeding to formulate and disseminate the rules and controls, but only some part of 
them is implemented for Clause 8 of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard. 
Finally, at 80% of 80 organizations, the rules and controls have been established with 
the approval of the management, and they are at least disseminated and implemented 
company-wide for Clause 10 Communications and Operations Management and 
Clause 11 Access Control, and at 70% of the organizations for Clause 15 
Compliance.  
On the other hand, at many of organizations, the management is aware of its 
necessity and they are proceeding to formulate and disseminate the rules and 
controls, but only some part of them is implemented for Clause 12 Information 
System Acquisition, Development and Maintenance, Clause 13 Information Security 
Incident Management, Clause 14 Business Continuity Management. 
5.2 Limitations 
The survey was conducted only to 80 organizations from 8 business industries as an 
initial point. The survey would cover more different organizations from different 
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business sectors. This may lead to obtainment of more sufficient and comparable 
results. 
5.3 Implications for Further Research 
The survey was mainly based on questions and answers and no evidence was 
obtained from the respondents. In order to support the consistency of the responses 
and detail the study, evidences related to the questions would be obtained from the 
organizations. This would also help the researcher to decide on the compliance level 
in a more efficient way and with a less judgmental approach.  
The respondents were asked to mark the most appropriate answer for each question 
of the survey and the answers were obtained by e-mails. Instead of this, the survey 
would be conducted via a comparative and quantative assessment tool, which shows 
information security maturity levels ISO/IEC 27001 compliance of organizations. 
Furthermore, a web-based self-assessment tool, which allows the organizations to 
visually check where the level of their security measures and positions compared 
with others would be developed. 
Finally, the study was performed according to the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 and ISO/IEC 
27001:2005 standards. However, ISO/IEC is planning to develop a new series of 
information security standards which include information security management 
system implementation guidance, information security management measurement 
and information security governance framework. Any or all of these standards may 
be taken as basis for further researches and studies. 
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APPENDIX A: Information Security Survey Questions 
Answers on a one-to-five scale that reflect the degree of maturity 
(1) The management is not aware of its necessity or no rule and control has been 
established even though they are aware of its necessity. 
(2) The management is aware of its necessity and they are proceeding to formulate 
and disseminate the rules and controls, but only some part of them is 
implemented. 
(3) The rules and controls have been established with the approval of the 
management, and they are disseminated and implemented company-wide, but 
the state of implementation has not been reviewed. 
(4) The rules and controls have been established under the leadership and approval of 
the management, and they are disseminated and implemented company-wide 
with its status reviewed on a regular basis by the responsible person. 
(5) In addition to those described in item 4 above, your company has improved it 
to become a good example for other companies by dynamically reflecting the 
changes of security. 
 
Survey Questions 
 
Please put (X) to the 
most appropriate 
box.          
1 2 3 4 5 
1) There is an information security policy document which is 
approved by management, and published and communicated 
to all employees and relevant external parties. * 
     
2) Management actively supports security within the 
organization through clear direction, demonstrated 
commitment, explicit assignment, and acknowledgement of 
information security responsibilities. * 
     
3) Requirements for confidentiality or non-disclosure 
agreements reflecting the organization's needs for the 
protection of information are identified and regularly 
reviewed. * 
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4) The organization's approach to managing information 
security and its implementation (i.e. control objectives, 
controls, policies, processes, and procedures for information 
security) is reviewed independently at planned intervals, or 
when significant changes to the security implementation 
occur. * 
     
5) The risks to the organization's information and 
information processing facilities from business processes 
involving external parties are identified and appropriate 
controls implemented before granting access. * 
     
6) All assets are clearly identified and an inventory of all 
important assets drawn up and maintained. *      
7) Information is classified in terms of its value, legal 
requirements, sensitivity and criticality to the organization. *      
8) Security roles and responsibilities of employees, 
contractors and third party users are defined and documented 
in accordance with the organization's information security 
policy. * 
     
9) Background verification checks on all candidates for 
employment, contractors, and third party users are carried out 
in accordance with relevant laws, regulations and ethics, and 
proportional to the business requirements, the classification 
of the information to be accessed, and the perceived risks. * 
     
10) All employees of the organization and, where relevant, 
contractors and third party users receive appropriate 
awareness training and regular updates in organizational 
policies and procedures, as relevant for their job function. * 
     
11) Responsibilities for performing employment termination 
or change of employment are clearly defined and assigned. *      
12) All employees, contractors and third party users return all 
of the organization's assets in their possession upon 
termination of their employment, contract or agreement.* 
     
13) The access rights of all employees, contractors and third 
party users to information and information processing 
facilities are removed upon termination of their employment, 
contract or agreement, or adjusted upon change. * 
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14) Security perimeters (barriers such as walls, card 
controlled entry gates or manned reception desks) are used to 
protect areas that contain information and information 
processing facilities. * 
     
15) Physical protection against damage from fire, flood, 
earthquake, explosion, civil unrest, and other forms of 
natural or man-made disaster is designed and applied. * 
     
16) Access points such as delivery and loading areas and 
other points where unauthorized persons may enter the 
premises are controlled and, if possible, isolated from 
information processing facilities to avoid unauthorized 
access. * 
     
17) Equipment is sited or protected to reduce the risks from 
environmental threats and hazards, and opportunities for 
unauthorized access. * 
     
18) Power and telecommunications cabling carrying data or 
supporting information services is protected from 
interception or damage. * 
     
19) All items of equipment containing storage media are 
checked to ensure that any sensitive data and licensed 
software has been removed or securely overwritten prior to 
disposal. * 
     
20) Operating procedures are documented, maintained, and 
made available to all users who need them. *      
21) Duties and areas of responsibility are segregated to 
reduce opportunities for unauthorized or unintentional 
modification or misuse of the organization’s assets. * 
     
22) Development, test and operational facilities are separated 
to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the 
operational system. * 
     
23) It is ensured that the security controls, service definitions 
and delivery levels included in the third party service 
delivery agreement are implemented, operated, and 
maintained by the third party. * 
     
24) The use of resources is monitored, tuned, and projections 
made of future capacity requirements to ensure the required 
system performance. * 
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25) Detection, prevention, and recovery controls to protect 
against malicious code and appropriate user awareness 
procedures are implemented. * 
     
26) Where the use of mobile code is authorized, the 
configuration ensures that the authorized mobile code 
operates according to a clearly defined security policy, and 
unauthorized mobile code is prevented from executing. * 
     
27) Back-up copies of information and software are taken 
and tested regularly in accordance with the agreed backup 
policy. * 
     
28) Networks are adequately managed and controlled, in 
order to be protected from threats, and to maintain security 
for the systems and applications using the network, including 
information in transit. * 
     
29) There are procedures in place for the management of 
removable media. *      
30) Formal exchange policies, procedures, and controls are in 
place to protect the exchange of information through the use 
of all types of communication facilities. * 
     
31) Media containing information is protected against 
unauthorized access, misuse or corruption during 
transportation beyond an organization’s physical boundaries. 
* 
     
32) Information involved in electronic commerce passing 
over public networks is protected from fraudulent activity, 
contract dispute, and unauthorized disclosure and 
modification. * 
     
33) Information involved in on-line transactions is protected 
to prevent incomplete transmission, mis-routing, 
unauthorized message alteration, unauthorized disclosure, 
unauthorized message duplication or replay. * 
     
34) The integrity of information being made available on a 
publicly available system is protected to prevent 
unauthorized modification. * 
     
35) Audit logs recording user activities, exceptions, and 
information security events are produced and kept for an 
agreed period to assist in future investigations and access 
control monitoring. * 
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36) Procedures for monitoring use of information processing 
facilities are established and the results of the monitoring 
activities reviewed regularly. * 
     
37) Logging facilities and log information are protected 
against tampering and unauthorized access. *      
38) Faults are logged, analyzed, and appropriate action 
taken.*      
39) An access control policy is established, documented, and 
reviewed based on business and security requirements for 
access. * 
     
40) There is a formal user registration and de-registration 
procedure in place for granting and revoking access to all 
information systems and services. * 
     
41) Users are required to follow good security practices in 
the selection and use of passwords. *      
42) A clear desk policy for papers and removable storage 
media and a clear screen policy for information processing 
facilities is adopted. * 
     
43) Users are only provided with access to the services that 
they have been specifically authorized to use. *      
44) Access to operating systems is controlled by a secure 
log-on procedure. *      
45) All users have a unique identifier (user ID) for their 
personal use only, and a suitable authentication technique 
shall be chosen to substantiate the claimed identity of a 
user.* 
     
46) Restrictions on connection times are used to provide 
additional security for high-risk applications. *      
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47) Access to information and application system functions 
by users and support personnel is restricted in accordance 
with the defined access control policy. * 
     
48) A formal policy is in place, and appropriate security 
measures shall be adopted to protect against the risks of 
using mobile computing and communication facilities. * 
     
49) Data input to applications is validated to ensure that this 
data is correct and appropriate. *      
50) A policy on the use of cryptographic controls for 
protection of information is developed and implemented. *      
51) There are procedures in place to control the installation 
of software on operational systems. *      
52) Test data is selected carefully, and protected and 
controlled. *      
53) The implementation of changes is controlled by the use 
of formal change control procedures. *      
54) When operating systems are changed, business critical 
applications are reviewed and tested to ensure there is no 
adverse impact on organizational operations or security. * 
     
55) Outsourced software development is supervised and 
monitored by the organization. *      
56) Information security events are reported through 
appropriate management channels as quickly as possible. *      
57) All employees, contractors and third party users of 
information systems and services are required to note and 
report any observed or suspected security weaknesses in 
systems or services. * 
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58) Management responsibilities and procedures are 
established to ensure a quick, effective, and orderly response 
to information security incidents. * 
     
59) Where a follow-up action against a person or 
organization after an information security incident involves 
legal action (either civil or criminal), evidence is collected, 
retained, and presented to conform to the rules for evidence 
laid down in the relevant jurisdiction(s). * 
     
60) A managed process is developed and maintained for 
business continuity throughout the organization that 
addresses the information security requirements needed for 
the organization's business continuity. * 
     
61) Events that can cause interruptions to business processes 
are identified, along with the probability and impact of such 
interruptions and their consequences for information 
security. * 
     
62) Plans are developed and implemented to maintain or 
restore operations and ensure availability of information at 
the required level and in the required time scales following 
interruption to, or failure of, critical business processes. * 
     
63) A single framework of business continuity plans is 
maintained to ensure all plans are consistent, to consistently 
address information security requirements, and to identify 
priorities for testing and maintenance. * 
     
64) Business continuity plans are tested and updated 
regularly to ensure that they are up to date and effective. *      
65) All relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual 
requirements and the organization's approach to meet these 
requirements are explicitly defined, documented, and kept up 
to date for each information system and the organization. * 
     
66) Appropriate procedures are implemented to ensure 
compliance with legislative, regulatory, and contractual 
requirements on the use of material in respect of which there 
may be intellectual property rights and on the use of 
proprietary software products. * 
     
67) Important records are protected from loss, destruction 
and falsification, in accordance with statutory, regulatory, 
contractual, and business requirements. * 
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68) Data protection and privacy are ensured as required in 
relevant legislation, regulations, and, if applicable, 
contractual clauses. * 
     
69) Managers ensure that all security procedures within their 
area of responsibility are carried out correctly to achieve 
compliance with security policies and standards. * 
     
70) Information systems are regularly checked for 
compliance with security implementation standards. *      
71) Audit requirements and activities involving checks on 
operational systems are carefully planned and agreed to 
minimize the risk of disruptions to business processes. * 
     
72) Access to information systems audit tools is protected to 
prevent any possible misuse or compromise. *      
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